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WHAT DO YOU DO WHEN YOU MEET A 
"WALKILNG VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH 
AMENDMENT" IF YOU'RE TRYING TO PUT 
THAT LAWYER'S CLIENT IN JAIL? 
Vanessa Merton* 
[A] prosecutor.. . enters a courtroom to speak for the People and 
not just some of the People. The prosecutor speaks not solely for the 
victim, or the police, or those who support them, but for all the 
People. That body of "The People" includes the defendant and his 
family and those who w e  about hi.' 
* Associate Dean for Clinical Education and Professor of Law. Pace University 
School of Law. I wish to thank the District Attorney of New York County. Mr. 
Robert Morgenthau, and dozens of other assistant district attorneys in his office, for 
the extraordinary moral, intellectual, and logistical support they provide to help the 
Pace clinical program create, in the words of another contributor to a Fordhm Law 
Review Ethics Symposium, "[llaw school graduates wvith high moral values, an 
understanding of ethical issues, and a concern for professionalismn and with "a 
heightened awareness of the [ethical] issues faced in the world of prosecution." Ellen 
S. Podgor, The Ethics and Professionalisnt of Prosecrcrors in Discrerionary Decisions, 
68 Fordham L. Rev. 1511, 1533 (2000) (calling for law schools to do a better job of 
educating future prosecutors about the role of the prosecutor and the proper exercise 
of prosecutorial discretion). 
Extra-special thanks to Iris Mercado. Assistant Clinic Administrator. for her heroic 
effort and outstanding technical ingenuity. Thanks also to colleagues (and former 
prosecutors and defense lawyers) Adele Bernhard. Stacy Caplow, Ben Gershman. 
Lima Griffin, Stephanie Hubelbank, Richard Klein, Holly Maguigan, Martha Rayner. 
Abbe Smith, Ellen Yaroshefsky, and Steve Zeidman for their helpful comments, too 
many of which were beyond my capacity to incorporate. 
This article is dedicated to Professor Harry Subin, Newv York University School of 
Law, 1970-2000, founder of the NYU Criminal Defense Clinic and the NYU 
Prosecution Clinic, and author of the Subin Report. U.S. Dep't of Justice. Criminal 
Justice in a Metropolitan Court (1966). who allowed me to collabonte with hi on 
the first Professional Responsibility course I ever taught, and who made me want to 
be, first, a criminal lawyer; second, a teacher of lawyers; and third. a lifelong student 
of the complexities of ethical professional life. May I have a hction of the positive 
impact on my students that he has had on his. 
1. State ex reL Romley v. Super. Ct., 891 P.2d 246. 250 (Ariz Ct. App. 1994) 
(quoting Carol A. Corrigan, On Prosecurorial Erl~ics, 13 Hastings Const. LQ. 537. 
538-39 (1986) (emphasis omitted)). 
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INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEMATIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
ABSTRACT COMMITMENT TO A PRINCIPLE AND CONCRETE 
BEHAVIOR IN A REAL CASE; OR, HARD CASES MAKE BAD 
LAWYERS 
When I became the faculty supervisor of the Pace Prosecution of 
Domestic Violence Clinic three years ago, I knew it would not be easy 
for a long-time defense lawyer to turn prosecutor-even a prosecutor 
of domestic violen~e.~ And I was not just a defense lawyer, but a 
hard-core LegAid? someone who had fallen in love with the New 
York City Criminal Court as a young student in the New York 
University Criminal Defense Clinic, and was thrilled when the 
legendary Marty Erdmann4 offered me the job of trial attorney in the 
2. I say "even.. . domestic violence" because to me the prosecution of these 
cases feels very different from, say, the prosecution of certain controlled substance 
offenses under our present drug laws. Prosecutors of domestic violence cannot define 
success simply as amassing convictions or obtaining severe sentences. The priority for 
the domestic violence prosecutor ought to be stopping the violence, and whatever 
creative disposition can be fashioned to do that should be the tactical objective. See 
American Prosecutors Research Institute, Violence Against Women: The Prosecution 
of Domestic Violence and Stalking Cases 145, 223-26 (1998); Office for Victims of 
Crime. U.S. Dep't of Justice, New Directions From the Field: Victims' Rights and 
Services for the 21st Century 82-90 (1998). 
3. "LegAid" is an approximate rendition of the less-than-affectionate term with 
which criminal defense attorneys on the staff of the Legal Aid Society of New York 
City were, and are, greeted by some of their clients in the holding pens behind 
courtrooms-where most client contact occurs-as in "Hey, LegAid! When you 
gonna get me outta here??" See Jonathan D. Casper, Did Yori Have a Lawyer When 
You Went to Court? No, I Had a Public Defender, 1 Yale Rev. L. & Soc. Action 4,544 
(1971); see abo Suzanne E. Mounts, Public Defender Programs, Professional 
Resporzsibility, and Competent Representation, 1982 Wis. L. Rev. 473, 474 (discussing 
client suspicion of and hostility toward appointed counsel expressed in "certain 
refrains which every defender has encountered," such as "I don't want a public 
defender, I want a real lawyer" or "Did you have an attorney on your last case? No, I 
had a public defender.") 
The Legal Aid Society of the City of New York is the world's largest public interest 
law firm, public defender, or civil legal services organization. See Legal Aid Society, 
The Legal Aid Society: The Law Finn for Poor People, at http://www.legal- 
aid.org/lasfaq. By contract, its lawyers are assigned to represent the vast majority of 
New York City's indigent defendants. See Michael McConville & Chester L. Mirsky, 
Criminal Defense in New York City, 15 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 582, 641-48 
(1986-87). 
4. Martin Erdmann was the Attorney-in-Chief of the Criminal Defense Division 
of the Legal Aid Society of the City of New York and a redoubtable character. 
During my first year of law school, he achieved national notoriety with the 
publication of an article called "I Have Nothing to Do With Justice" in the March 12, 
1971 edition of Life magazine. In that article, Erdmann was quoted as saying (in his 
usual temperate fashion), "There are so few trial judges who just judge, who rule on 
questions of law, and leave guilt or innocence to the jury. And Appellate Division 
judges aren't any better. They're the whores who became madams. I would like to 
[be a judge] just to see if I could be the kind of judge I think a judge should be. But 
the only way you can get it is to be in politics or buy it-and I don't even know the 
going price." In re Justices of the App. Div. v. Erdmann, 33 N.Y.2d 559,560 (1973) 
(Burke, J., dissenting) (quoting Life, Mar. 12, 1971). As a result, Erdmann was 
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Criminal Defense Division of the Legal Aid Society of the City of 
New York. 
Soon I was a union delegate for the Association of Legal Aid 
Attorneys, helping to organize a lengthy and painful lawyers' strike to 
achieve continuity of representation: i.e., the right to have a 
relationship with our clients that bore some semblance to the 
relationship people with money to hire private counsel have with their 
 attorney^.^ I became a member of the National Lawyers Guild in 
1972, and still am. For five years after I ambivalently left Legal Aid to 
start teaching in my true alma mater, the NYU Criminal Defense 
Clinic, I insisted on staying on "temporary leave'hnd held on to my 
Legal Aid Society identification card like a talisman to assure me that 
I was still engaged in righteous work. (I'm sure I have it somewhere 
to this day.) Some of my closest friends, and many of my favorite 
students, are long-time LegAids. And I never "burned out," although 
I certainly had some burnt-out moments, of the sort so poignantly 
captured in Randy Bellows' Notes of a Public Defender.' 
More than that, I had always seen the prosecutor's job as 
comparatively, well, straightfonvard7-nowhere near the challenge of 
trying to help, on myriad levels, an indigent defendant who was almost 
always in jail, with few real friends, a dysfunctional family, scant 
education or coping skills, and frequently tormented by drug 
withdrawal. The prosecutors, it seemed to me, could sit and wait until 
the cops brought them cases, if not on a silver platter, at least in a file: 
witnesses, evidence, and a coherent enough story to have occasioned 
an arrest. If a prosecutor needs more help to put the case together, ail 
she has to do is call on the cops or on the array of other resources at 
brought up on disciplinary charges and found guilty of professional misconduct by the 
Appellate Division, Third Department, which censured him. Id. at 559. A few weeks 
before I took the bar exam and started work at Legal Aid, he was exonerated on 
appeal. Id at 560. Ultimately, inevitably, he was himself elevated to the Criminal 
Court bench. 
5. The travesty of discontinuous representation characteristic of the Legal Aid 
Society and other institutional defenders during this period is well described in the 
horrendous but entirely routine experience of the defendant in Unired States er rel. 
Thomas v. Zelker, 332 F. Supp. 595, 601 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (reversing conviction 
because of ineffective assistance by the Legal Aid Society.) In this m e ,  over a five- 
month period, Legal Aid provided from five to nine different attorneys, many of 
whose names could not be determined, and none of whom had ever met wtith the 
defendant's prospective witnesses or conducted any other factual investigation prior 
to his trial. See id at 597-98; see also Wallace v. Kern. 392 F. Supp. 834, 86-40 
(E.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 481 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1973) (describing Legal 
Aid Society clients who suffered from fragmented representation. meloads that were 
incompatible with competent representation, and frequent guilty pleas with no prior 
investigation of defenses). 
6. Randy Bellows, Notes of a Public Defender, in Phillip B.  Heymann & Lance 
Liebman, The Social Responsibilities of Lawyers: Case Studies 69 (1988). 
7. See Abbe Smith, Defending tlte Innoce~tt. 32 Conn. L. Rev. 485.509-13 (2000) 
(contending that a defense lawyer must become more of a "creative artist" than a 
prosecutor). 
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her disposal. If subpoenas need to be served, if a site should be 
photographed, if a witness needs a ride home, if the ADA wants to 
talk to five other guys who hang out on the same block as the 
perpetrator, if she wants a rap sheet on a character witness-all could 
be arranged.8 Meanwhile, I could try going up to a bar at 138th and 
Lenox at 2:00 a.m. to see if I could find a red-haired guy called Diablo 
who didn't want to be found, because according to my client, "Diablo 
saw the whole thing-some other dude did it."9 
The point is not that I have some good war stories to tell, but that it 
is important to acknowledge the impact of early, formative 
experiences of professional socialization on the ethical and moral 
perspective that a lawyer brings to bear on his experience. It is no 
accident that former prosecutors and former defense lawyers 
appointed to the criminal court bench render diametrically opposed 
decisions on similar facts, applying the same law. Nor (with a couple 
of notable exceptions) is it the product of conscious bias, if by that is 
meant an intentional effort to assist former colleagues or adhere to an 
ideological commitment. But every lawyer who practices at 100 
Centre Streetlo (all right, every good lawyer) is well aware of the 
professional pedigree of the judges before whom we appear, and we 
adjust our expectations and tactics accordingly." As a lawyer who 
8. Lest any D.A.N.Y. colleagues who might read this start to sputter, I want to 
say emphatically that three years as a quasi-prosecutor have disabused me of this 
notion-or rather, balanced it with an experiential sense of just how difficult it is to 
build, and then maintain through the insanity of the urban criminal justice process, a 
case that is free from reasonable doubt. 
However, many other ex-prosecutors now in a position to reflect on their 
experience do not hesitate to acknowledge the advantages inherent to the 
prosecution. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, 26 
Fordham Urb. L.J. 607, 625-29 (1999) [hereinafter Green, Why Should Prosecutors 
"Seek Justice "?I. 
9. A frequent enough formulation to earn the sobriquet among LegAids of the 
"SODDI defensew-to be distinguished from the "Chicago defense" as in "I've been 
thinking about moving to Chicago . . ." 
10. 100 Centre Street refers to the address of the Criminal Court of the City of 
New York, New York County, and the Supreme Court of the State of New York, 
Criminal Term, New York County. 
11. Of course, there are identifiable reverse-prototypes: for example, Harold 
Rothwax, the brilliant, bitter "Prince of Darkness," as both sides came to call him 
during the more than a quarter-century that he presided over criminal cases in New 
York County. Justice Rothwax, who had spent six years as a Legal Aid Society trial 
attorney, and founded and directed the early community-based legal services office, 
Mobilization for Youth, became progressively more disenchanted with the rights of 
the accused. His controversial book, Guilty: The Collapse of Criminal Justice, 
severely criticizes such basic decisions as Miranda v. Arizona, 348 U.S. 436 (1966). 
and is the most chillingly anti-defendant account of the criminal justice system I've 
ever read. Harold J. Rothwax, Guilty: The Collapse of Criminal Justice 85-87 (1996); 
see also Richard Klein, The Relationship of the Court and Defense Counsel: The 
Impact on Competent Representation and Proposals for Reform, 29 B.C. L. Rev. 531, 
553-54 (1988) [hereinafter Klein, The Relationship of the Court and Defense Counsel] 
(describing Justice Rothwax's handling of cases). I'm not aware of any 
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once could no more have dreamed of becoming a prosecutor than of 
changing my gender, who is still greeted with disbelief by former 
comrades when they see me stand behind a student on the 
prosecutor's side of the table,12 but who now seeks, through my 
student assistant district attorneys, to protect victims and stop their 
criminal abuse as relentlessly as ever I fought for a client's freedom,13 
I bring a tangle of perceptions and values acquired over more than 
two decades to this analysis. It would be naive to think that doesn't 
matter. 
For the purpose of this article, the relevance of my experience is 
this: if ever one might expect to find a prosecutor inclined to err on 
the side of fairness of process and protecting the rights of defendants, 
it ought to be me. Also, for more than twenty years, I have been 
something of a professional ethicist-as research fellow, teacher, staff 
member of an ethics center, chair andlor member of several 
institutional review boards, pro bono trial counsel to a disciplinary 
-- -- 
counterexamples of former prosecutors adopting a predictably pro-defendant stance. 
although no doubt they exist. But whichever way the experience skewts a judge's 
perspective-for or against his former position-almost always it has a palpable, and 
in many cases powerful, effect. 
12. To old defense friends who look askance at my metamorphosis, I a n  say only 
that in working with students who seem bound to become career prosecutors, I 
consciously try to inculcate, almost inoculate, them with a clear sense of the 
prosecutor's uniquely nonadversarial role. I believe in it, I explicitly teach about it, 
and I model it. This multifaceted role includes elements of neutral objectivity and 
dispassionate evaluation not only of the facts of a case, but of their legal. social, and 
moral implications. See H. Richard Uviller, Tile Ne1itral Prosenitor: The Obligation of 
Dispassion in a Passionate Pursuit, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 1695, 1697-1705 (2000). 
While all lawyers may have to temper their dedication to the client's interest with 
some degree of fidelity to the court and the legal process (for an excellent analysis of 
this point see Kevin C. McMunigal, Are Prosearrorial Erl~ics Sta~~dards Differenr?, 68 
Fordham L. Rev. 1453. 1458-61 (2000)). this dual function is more dominant and 
demanding for prosecutors than for most attorneys who represent clients. "Although 
the prosecutor operates within the adversary system, it is fundamental that the 
prosecutor's obligation is to protect the innocent as well as to convict the guilty, to 
guard the rights of the accused as well as to enforce the rights of the public." ABA 
Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution Function and Defense Function 5 (3d ed. 
1993). 
13. Strange as it might seem to a British barrister, see Bennett I.. Gershman. The 
New Prosecutors, 53 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 393,456 (1992), or to the many alums of the New 
York County DA's office who have become highly successful private defense counsel. 
I decided when I joined this program that there would be no going back. I do not 
expect ever to practice criminal defense again, unless perhaps in an isolated case 
involving someone like a member of my family (God forbid!). and even then, never in 
New York County. While technically there would be no breach of ethics, see N.Y. 
Code of Prof 1 Responsibility DR 9-101(b)(3) (1999) [hereinafter N.Y. Code], so long 
as it was not a case that the Pace Prosecution of Domestic Violence Clinic had 
handled, for me it would be a breach of trust. I know that my understanding of the 
way a defense lawyer thinks and strategizes is advantageous for my students, and I'm 
sure that all I've absorbed by osmosis from the DA's office would benefit me were I 
to return to the defense side. It would not seem right to so exploit the access and 
acceptance I've experienced in this office. 
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committee, ethics consultant, and expert witness-and, therefore, one 
might think, especially susceptible to the weight of ethical discourse 
and analysis. 
What prompts me to write about the case and the issue that are the 
subject of this piece is that despite all the above, when the critical 
moment came in this particular case-with a particular complainant 
who was terrified and desperate, and a particular defendant who (to 
me) was not only guilty but dangerous-I could not bring myself or 
require my students to intervene to assure the defendant his 
constitutional right to competent representation, even though in the 
abstract, I believe that to be a prosecutor's duty. I hasten to add that 
not all prosecutors would agree, and that this duty is nowhere 
specifically imposed on prosecutors in the applicable codes of ethics.'" 
I doubt that I could be disciplined for what I did, or rather, failed to 
do. Ilowever, as someone committed in principle to the concept of 
"ethical discretion in lawyering"15 that is so much in vogue in the 
literature these days, and cognizant of its special merit in the 
prosecutorial context, I generally treat the ethics code as a floor, not a 
ceiling, for my conduct. Unanimity or broad approbation has never 
been my touchstone for ethical decision-making; in fact, a significant 
component of my curriculum revolves around acquiring the capacity 
to choose knowledgeably among competing role-definitions, and to 
depart, when correct to do so, from the standard professional norm.16 
14. Inability to find "authority" for an ethical proposition-i.e. its codification in a 
principle or rule, an ethics committee opinion, or judicial exegesis-has never been of 
great moment in my ethical decision-making because I tend to view these as 
precatory, even though they may be framed as mandatory. 
Ethical precepts for lawyers do not evoke compliance because sanctions are 
theoretical, given the reality in most jurisdictions that violations are detected and 
disciplined at a rate that makes enforcement of the apocryphal prohibition on 
mattress-tag removal look successful. Most of the time, most lawyers will get away 
with violating ethics codes, if they choose to do so; the utility of the codes et al. for the 
lawyer confronting a prospective dilemma (rather than judging past behavior) seems 
to me as an historical account of the thinking of many wise, respected, and caring 
lawyers, and a distillation of the recommendation one might expect if able to consult 
them directly. 
When analyzing my own ethical responsibilities as a prosecutor, and as a supervisor 
and teacher of prosecutors, I insist that we review all available resources and 
authorities, whether or not they happen to be binding in our jurisdiction, or even if 
they have been overturned by a subsequent decision, because, for our purposes, all is 
grist for our mill. This is not to suggest that I make no effort to assess the likelihood 
that a particular choice could bring opprobrium on our parent office, humiliation on 
our law school, or difficulty to the bar admission of the students; the codification of a 
specific duty may be a significant factor in that calculus. Such a prediction does not, 
in and of itself, tell us whether a proposed course of action is "right." 
15. See, e.g., William H .  Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 
1083, 1.090-91 (1988) (stating that a lawyer should always take actions that, in a 
particular case, are most likely to promote justice; this model of lawyering is inspired 
by the example of prosecutorial discretion). 
16. One of the primary evaluation criteria of our clinical program is: 
Developing sense of responsibility for professional choices and their consequences 
Heinonline - -  69 Fordham L. Rev. 1002 2 0 0 0 - 2 0 0 1  
So the lack of specific direction from the law of lawyering does not 
explain my failure to take the ethical measures that, in the abstract, I 
espouse. 
While few academics or bar counsel seem even to have considered 
the question of the prosecutor's responsibility for the quality of a 
defendant's representation,'' as I will discuss, more than one scholar 
has persuasively asserted that this duty exists.ts I find their analyses 
Recognition of ethical issues and relevant professional norms and standards, Ability to research 
professional ethics; Ability to analyze critically the validity of professional norms and standards, 
Abiity to recognize and choose among conflicting professional norms and personal values; 
Abiity and inclination to articulate reasoning behind ethical choices; Coherence and mnsistency 
of ethical reasoning. 
17. I make such a statement with more trepidation than temerity, awaiting the 
inevitable appearance of a recent and comprehensive law review article on this 
precise point located by one of my readers, or preferably, one of the editors of this 
Symposium. Among the sources consulted in search of guidance were the follo\ving: 
(1) The Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct (4th ed. 1999): 
the Rule, Comment, and Legal Background of the following sections: 
Preamble (A Lawyer's Responsibilities), Rules 1.1 (Competence). 13 
(Diligence), 1.4 (Communication). 3.4 (Fairness to Opposing Party and 
Counsel), 3.5 (Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal), 3.8 (Special 
Responsibilities of a Prosecutor), 4.2 (Communication with Person 
Represented by Counsel), 4.3 (Dealing with Unrepresented Person), 8 3  
(Reporting Professional Misconduct). and 8.4 (Misconduct); 
(2) The ABAlBNA Lawyer's Manual on Professional Conduct (1999): 
$0 31:201-31509 (Competence, Diligence, and Communication), 61:601- 
61:630 (Prosecutors), and 101:201-101:208 (Reporting hlisconduct); 
(3) Charles W. Wolfram, Modem Legal Ethics (1986): Chapter 5 (Lawvyer 
Competence); $$12.10 (Disclosing Lawyers' hlisconduct), 13.10 
(Prosecutors), and 14.6 (Effective Assistance of Counsel); 
(4) The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution Function and 
Defense Function (3d ed. 1993); 
(5) National District Attorneys' Association. National Prosecution 
Standards (2d ed. 1991). $0 6.1-6.5 (Professionalism). 24.1-24.6 
(Relations With the Defendant), 25.1-25.6 (Relations With Defense 
Counsel); 
(6) John Jay Douglass, Ethical Issues in Prosecution (1988); 
(7) Randolph N. Jonakait, Tire Etirical Prosecrttor's hfiscondrtct. 23 Crim. L. 
Bull. 550 (1987); 
(8) Bennett L. Gershman, Prosecutorid Misconduct (2d ed. 1999); Bemett 
L. Gershman, The New Prosec~ctors, 53 U .  Pitt. L. Rev. 393 (1992); 
Bennett L. Gershman, Why Prosecrctors Afisbel~ave. 22 Crim. L. Bull. 
131 (1986); and 
(9) all of the articles in last year's Syr~rposirtn~ Ethics in Crintinal Advocacy. 
68 Fordham L. Rev. 1371-1718 (2000). 
18. See principally Fred C. Zacharias, Srrrcctrtri~rg the Etlrics of Prosectctorial Trial 
Practice Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 45.66-74 (1991) [hereinafter 
Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics] (suggesting possible interventions by a prosecutor 
when defense counsel's performance is "substandard"); see also Bruce A. Green, Her 
Brother's Keeper The Prosecutor's Responsibility IYlren Defense Colcnsel Has o 
Potential Conflict of Interest, 16 Am. J. Crim. L. 323,324 (1989) [hereinafter Green, 
Her Brother's Keeper] (noting that a prosecutor has a duty to "ensure that a criminal 
defendant is not unjustly convicted and that the proceedings leading up to a 
conviction are fair"). For a further discussion of Stncctttring tire Etlria, see infra notes 
62-88 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of Her Brotlrer's Keeper. see 
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logical, the predicted impact on the criminal justice system positive in 
utilitarian terms, and the concern for defendants' rights appealing. In 
the case described below, I had the perfect opportunity to act in 
accord with both my intellectual beliefs and my political instincts. 
Why, then, did I fail to do my duty? While in twenty-seven years of 
practice my students and I have certainly made ethical errors and 
arrived at misjudgments, I cannot recall another occasion when, 
having reached closure on an ethical decision, I simply failed to 
implement it. 
Or did I? Perhaps it's not that I lacked the ethical will to adhere to 
the course of action that in theory I embraced. Perhaps I was, albeit 
somewhat unconsciously, engaged in the perfectly respectable practice 
of casuistry: a "particularized, context-driven method" of ethical 
decision-making.19 One question I address later in this article is the 
legitimacy of a prosecutor's use of casuistry under any circumstances. 
The more troubling question, however, is whether, in this instance and 
in others, casuistry can become "just another for the gap 
between commitment to an ethical principle and performance in 
accord with that principle in a particular case. 
This experience has taught me that, ironically, taking the textured, 
nuanced, and casuistric approach to ethical decision-making grounded 
in the prosecutor's noble-sounding "duty to do justice" can offer a 
convenient-nonetheless valid, perhaps, but convenient-rationale 
for prosecutors not to protect a defendant's right to competent 
counsel. Absent an explicit, codified directive, it is easy-I will not 
(yet) say too easy, but definitely easy-to decide that the prosecutor's 
generic duty to do justice does not require a prosecutor to try to 
rectify the perceived inadequacy of defense counsel in a particular 
case. Even when defense counsel's deficiency is so blatant that it 
would seem to present a "paradigm case", in the parlance of 
casuistry,2l the overall context of the realities of both the urban 
criminal justice system and the lawyer disciplinary system may seem 
to justify a different choice. Taking the case-by-case approach even to 
a much more specific rule, like the rule requiring lawyers to report 
other lawyers' misconduct, likewise may not generate sufficient 
impetus to compensate for the countervailing factors. 
One way to frame the question is: When a prosecutor encounters a 
defense lawyer who seems to be neglecting a client or grossly 
mishandling the defense, to a degree that constitutes a violation of the 
infra notes 51-61 and accompanying text. 
19. Paul R. Tremblay, The New Casuistry, 12 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 489,492 (1999) 
[hereinafter Tremblay, The New Casuistry]. 
20. "Freedom's just another word for nothing left to lose.. ." Kris Kristofferson, 
Me and Bobby McGee (Monument Records 1971). 
21. Tremblay, The New Casuistry, supra note 19, at 517-19. 
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applicable ethical code, what, if anything, does the prosecutor have an 
ethical obligation to do? 
Posed in the abstract, an ethics junkie like myself should have had 
no trouble answering: "Plenty." And yet, embodied in an actual case, 
the answer became far murkier. 
The problem is illustrated by the followving story-which, 
considering what I believe to be the unsettled state of professional 
ethics on this point, let us say is entirely hypothetical. So: imagine 
that this, or something like this, happened this spring. For if it did not, 
surely no one familiar with 100 Centre Street can doubt that it could 
have. Yet, prior to (imagining) having witnessed this scene, in more 
than twenty-five years of practice and deep and energetic study of 
professional ethics in general and prosecutorial ethics in particular, 
this question had not occurred to me. 
I .  WHO WAS THAT MASKED MAN? 
A. The Student ADAs ("SADAs") Meet Opposing Colinsel 
It was a typical scene outside an All-Purpose Part of the Criminal 
Court,= which I won't even try to describe except with a few words 
and phrases that do not do it justice: hot, smelly, dirty, noisy, 
crowded, crying children, drunk or drugged derelicts, bored cops, 
frantic lawyers racing to distant courtrooms, court officers trying to 
locate absent lawyers, pay phones ringing, cell phones ringing, a kind 
of lackadaisical pandemoni~m.~ (Can't you see why I love the 
place?) 
Two of my SADAs had been told that the defense lawyer on one of 
their cases had "signed in" with the court officers, which meant he 
might, or might not, be in the environs. They had been trying for 
weeks to contact this lawyer; he had not appeared at two prior court 
dates, nor responded to nearly a dozen phone and fax messages. We 
had concerns about the victim's somewhat fragmentary description of 
this crime. The SADAs wanted to hear from the defense attorney, as 
much as he would tell us, the defendant's side of the story. This was a 
first arrest, with no apparent prior history of abuse, no serious injury," 
and the SADAs wanted to know if there were weaknesses or 
inconsistencies in the victim's story that should give us pause. (One of 
the strong ethical precepts reinforced in the Prosecution of Domestic 
22. For an equally dire picture, but constructed with facts and figures rather than 
adjectives, see Hany I. Subin, The New York Ciry Crinlinal Colmrr The Case for 
Abolition, Center for Research in Crime and Justice. New York University School of 
Law, Occasional Papers No. XI1 (Graham Hughes ed.. 1992). 
23. For a fuller description of the "physical squalor" of lower criminal courts in 
most American cities, see Abbe Smith, Carrying on in Criminal Court: \Vllen Criminal 
Defense is Not So Sexy and Other Grievances, 1 Clinical L. Rev. 723.741-45 (1995). 
24. N.Y. Penal Law Q 10.00(9) (McKinney 1998). 
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Violence Clinic is that we don't plea-bargain, or even ACD,25 cases 
that we believe lack merit. We dismiss them. I should add that we've 
dismissed precious few cases; our holistic, victim-centered approach26 
to family violence prosecution has enabled us to find substantial 
evidence of guilt in the great majority of our cases.) 
As the SADAs sought their quarry, I was hovering within earshot, 
yellow pad poised for note-taking on their communication skills, 
negotiation, fact investigation, professionalism, and, of course, their 
ethical awareness. And, as is always the case, I was operating on our 
standard protocol that I do not speak or intervene or second-guess or 
participate unless (1) the SADA invites me to, or (2) I see irrevocable 
and serious error about to be ~ommitted.~' 
- - - - - - - -- 
25. "ACD" is the acronym used in New York state courts to refer to a disposition 
of "adjournment in contemplation of dismissal." See N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 5 170.55(2) 
(McKinney 1993 & Supp. 2000) (allowing adjournment sine die on consent of both the 
People and the defendant, which will lead to an eventual dismissal "in furtherance of 
justice" unless, within six months (or a year if a family offense), the People request 
and the court grants restoration of the case to the calendar (typically because of a re- 
arrest)). 
26. See Stacy Caplow, What if There is No Client?: Prosecictors as "Coimselors" of 
Crime Victims, 5 Clinical L. Rev. 1,35-43 (1998) (proposing a "victim-centric" model 
of increased communication with and participation by victims, especially in decisions 
on charging, plea bargaining, and sentencing). Professor Caplow, Director of Clinical 
Education at Brooklyn Law School, is another former LegAid who has switched 
sides; she was the Director of Training in the Kings County DA's office, and this year, 
she is a visiting faculty member in the NYU Law School Prosecution Clinic. 
27. Another topic that has inspired a large literature, and that poses perhaps THE 
single toughest pedagogical question for clinical faculty, is what we denominate as 
"intervention." Ideally, clinical teachers would be human recorders, watching our 
students pro-actively take the initiative in every minute detail of planning and 
execution of lawyering tasks, albeit preceded and followed by didactic instruction, 
simulated preparation, out-of-role consultation, case conferences, late-night phone 
calls, review of documents, critique of performances, e-mailed exchanges, and so 
forth-but no outright intervention, no stepping in to take over the job. As I 
ceaselessly tell and write and remind and exhort my students, my co-supervisors, and 
myself, it is harder to learn from undoing or redoing OTHER people's mistakes, or 
from watching someone else do it "RIGHT," than from experiencing the 
consequences of one's own choices, including the inevitable mistakes. This is sort of 
the "Prime Directive" of what I, diehard old dinosaur that I have become, consider 
true clinical teaching. 
Among clinicians, the ethical and moral issues of allegedly using clinic clients as 
"guinea pigs" for hapless students to learn their craft have been exhaustively debated, 
the countervailing rationales well-presented, and the analogues to the health 
professions identified. Readers may refer to a rich literature. See, e.g., David F. 
Chavkin, Am I My Client's Lawyer?: Role Definition and the Clinical Sitpervisor, 51 
SMU I,. Rev. 1507 (1998); George Critchlow, Professional Responsibility, Student 
Practice, and the Clinical Teacher's Duty to Intervene, 26 Gonz. L. Rev. 415 (1991); 
Peter Toll Hoffman, The Stages of the Clinical Supervisory Relationship, 4 Antioch 
L.J. 301 (1986); Kenneth R. Kreiling, Clinical Editcation and Lawyer Competency: 
The Process of Learning to Learn From Experience Through Properly Str~ccttcred 
Clinical Supervision, 40 Md. L. Rev. 284 (1981); Michael Meltsner et al., The Bike 
Tour Leader's Dilemma: Talking About Supervision, 13 Vt. L. Rev. 399 (1989); Ann 
Shalleck, Clinical Contexts: Theory and Practice in Law and Supervision, 21 N.Y.U. 
Rev. L. & Soc. Change 109 (1993-94); James H. Stark et al., Directiveness in Clinical 
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I could see that the SADAs were a bit taken aback by the 
demeanor of the man who finally responded to their calls of "Mr. 
Defender! Is the lawyer for Juan ClienteB here?'" along, he had 
been leaning against a wall, scribbling with a pencil on a stack of files. 
He had no briefcase or satchel or backpack to hold a handy CPL or 
Penal Law. He was, to put it politely, unkempt: flushed, perspiring, 
uncombed, unshaven, shirt-tails hanging out of his  trouser^.^ My first 
Supervision, 3 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 35 (1993); see also Association of American Lawv 
Schools Section on Clinical Legal Education, Final Report of tile Cornnlittee on rite 
Future of the In-House Clinic (August 1990) (discussing guidelines and educational 
structure of in-house clinics). 
For me, with age and experiential learning (life imitating art imitating life'?) has 
come less frantic a need to make sure the student gets it right the first time. bccause 
experience has so often shown that what I was positive was "right" for the la\vyer in 
the situation in a given moment, actually wasn't, and about equally often, the 
horrendous student error that I was gripping my chair in an effort not to rise to 
address has turned out to be a brilliant strategic stroke. In the particular context of 
Criminal Court, I find reassuring my colleague Steve Zeidman's empirical 
investigation of the relative quality of representation provided by defense clinic 
students and that of institutional defenders. See Steven Zeidman. Stzcrificial La~rlbs or 
the Chosen Few? The Impact of Student Deferrders on tile Rigilts of tile ricc~~sed. 62 
Brooklyn L. Rev. 853 (1996) (concluding that students provide superior 
representation both in terms of results achieved and in their performance of 
lawyering tasks). 
28. I preserve the Hispanic appearance of the client's name only because of a 
later, repeated slip of the tongue (or worse) by Mr. Defender that contributed to our 
overall assessment of his representation. It may well be that the obligation to take 
action in the face of defender incompetence is even greater when that incompetence 
is coupled with blatant racism, sexism, heterosesism. etc. Increasingly the organized 
bar is recognizing the incompatibility of bigotry with professionalism. See, e-g., N.Y. 
Code, supra note 13, DR 1-102(A)(6) (prohibiting unlawful discrimination in the 
practice of law on the basis of age, race, creed, color, national origin. sex, disability. or 
marital status); Comment to Model Rule 8.4 as amended by the ABA House of 
Delegates in 1998 (during client representation, professional misconduct for law.;yer to 
manifest prejudice on the basis of race, sex, religion, national origin, disability. sexual 
orientation, or socioeconomic status "when prejudicial to the administration of 
justice") (discussed in Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 584 (4U ed. 
1999)). However, I have been unable to locate any judicial decision or ethics opinion 
equating such prejudice, even when directed at the la\vyer's o\an client, waith either 
ineffective assistance or Canon 6 incompetence. 
29. Deliberately, because I think it would distract from my major point. I am not 
going to identify whether this attorney was: (1) a staff attorney from the Legal Aid 
Society; (2) a member of one of the alternative contract defenders offices that, in the 
wake of the last Legal Aid Society lawyer strike. received contracts from the City of 
New York to handle a certain number of criminal cases, so that the City \.;ill never 
again be wvholly dependent on Legal Aid for the bulk of its criminal docket; or (3) a 
private practitioner who has been permitted to join the "1s-B" panel of la\.;yers who 
receive rotating assignments to criminal cases at a statutory fee n t e  that is the rough 
equivalent of what Medicaid pays psychiatrists-i.e., about 20% of the going n t e  per 
hour. See Gary Muldoon & Sandra J. Feuerstein, Handling a Criminal Case in New 
York 2-5 to 2-8 (1999). He could have been any one of these. and quite possibly at 
various points in his career, all of them. The one other fact about this Iawver that I 
will reveal is that, long ago, he had been an Assistant District Attorney, although I 
will not say in which office. 
I am quite certain that this attorney's prior or current institutional affiliations had 
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thought was he must be unusually dedicated to come to court when he 
was so obviously sick with the flu. 
As it developed, that didn't seem to be the problem. 
Aha, you say, he was drunk. Or on drugs. Or needed to get drunk 
or high. Well, maybe. My once keenly discerning internal substance- 
abuse-detector didn't register that, though. No, Mr. Defender's 
difficulties were perhaps even more deep-seated. 
One SADA began with the usual, "Hi, Mr. Defender, my name's 
Jennifer Ling and this is my colleague Dan Jones; we're the student 
assistant district attorneys assigned to the case of your client, Juan 
Cliente, and we were hoping to talk with you about-" 
Mr. D: What the hell are you, anyway? Asian? Another goddam 
immigrant I have to deal with? Bad enough I have all these 
Mexican bastards for clients. Which one is this, now? (Shuffling 
through files.) Sanchez, you said? Yeah, another one who doesn't 
even speak English. I'd like to know what we're supposed to do 
when our clients can't even speak the damn language. 
[A longer pause than is usual. I suggest to my students as a general 
stance of litigation, seizing the momentum, taking command of the 
situation, if in front of a judge, stepping into the silences (unless the 
judge is reading something), etc., etc. However, in this instance, I 
thought my students' silence both understandable and perhaps the 
best strategy for the moment, since I sure couldn't think of what to 
say.] 
SADA Jones: Uh, Mr. Defender, we've been trying to get hold of 
you because we thought it might make sense to get an idea.. . 
Mr. D: Okay, here it is-Sanchez, yeah, another car thief. Probably 
young, though, you know? Maybe not such a bad kid-maybe he 
does it to support his dear mother. (Head thrown back, a gleeful 
guffaw over his own wit.) What are you looking for? These guys 
don't care if they get a conviction as long as there's no jail. How 
'bout a fine? He can always steal another car to pay it. (Another 
raucous guffaw that descended into a giggle. Then he started 
working on something in his ear.) 
[At this point I'm wondering whether, after all these years, 
zero impact on our ethical decision-making. Arguably, a prosecutor might have 
reason to believe that intervention would be more effective, and therefore more 
obligatory, if the offending lawyer were institutionally-based rather than a Lone 
Ranger, because a "supervisor" might want to maintain credibility with the DA's 
office; on the other hand, defense lawyers, who certainly can be viciously critical of 
one another, have a long tradition of closing ranks and refusing to acknowledge bad 
behavior when the issue is raised by an outsider, especially an outsider viewed as 
hostile. Were I a supervisor at Legal Aid or another institutional provider of defense 
services, I would certainly look askance at a complaint of misfeasance emanating from 
the DA's office, and would be quick to suspect that it had been prompted by an 
excess, not a deficiency, of zeal on the part of my staff attorney. 
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someone has actually set me up, as some kind of weird joke, with a 
genuine actor from Central Casting, parodying the type of revolting, 
rip-off artist, sleazebag defense lawyer that still haunts our criminal 
justice systems, whether from the assigned counsel panel or the public 
defender or private criminal defense offices. Was today April I? My 
birthday? No. There was no obvious explanation why someone 
would do such a thing today.] 
SADA Ling (recovering): Actually, no, Mr. Defender, the case 
we're on is Mr. CLIENTE, that's C - L - I - E - N - T - E, not 
Sanchez. And it's not a car case, it's.. . 
Mr. D: You wanta tell me why there are hvo of you guys ganging up 
on me on one lousy piece of sh-t misdemeanor? What'd I do, \vin 
the lottery or something? 
[So, Mr. Defender and I were having similar reactions of confusion 
and disbelief. . . .I 
SADA Ling: You see, Dan and I are both third-year law students in 
the clinical program at Pace Law School- 
[Good, Jennifer. He's upset that there are two of you. Better to 
have you continue than to have Dan chime in and double-team 
him . . .I 
Mr. Defender steps back, flinging his arms up as if he's been shot, 
with an inarticulate cry of dismay and disgust. 
Mr. D: STU-U-DENTS!!! What ya kidding me, students??? Now I 
gotta deal with this? Naaah, I don't think so. I don't have time for 
this. Sorry, you look l i e  nice kids, but the defendant has rights, too, 
you know. This is f- - -g ridiculous, I've had "STU-U-DENTS" 
before-the worst time was the one supposed to be my co-counsel, 
HAH! THAT was a joke!!! (Pause.) Hey, Pedro or whatever your 
name is, come over here. You got lucky, buddy, you're gonna be 
prosecuted by STU-U-DENTS this time. 
None of us on the prosecution team had noticed in the human 
kaleidoscope of the hallway that the defendant, Mr. Cliente, had left 
the courtroom where we'd last seen him and was now standing several 
feet away from Mr. Defender. Mr. Cliente, as always on his court 
dates, was neatly dressed and clean-shaven and carrying a small 
leather portfolio under his arm. He responded to Mr. Defender's 
overture slowly (certainly understandable) and came only a little 
closer. It was evident to us that he did not appreciate being addressed 
as "Pedro" (his name was Juan). Mr. Cliente was actually well aware 
that Jennifer and Dan were law students certified and authorized to 
practice as student assistant district attorneys because on at least one 
of his court dates, that had been explained to the presiding judge, who 
was unfamiliar with the phenomenon. 
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bIr. D: Yeah, folks, okay, so this is your man. This is Pedro. Now, 
listen Pedro, how much was that car worth anyway-can you pay it 
back, you know, make restitution- 
[Jennifer and Dan look at each other and then simultaneously turn 
back toward me for a moment-something we all generally try to 
avoid in mid-event-but the good news was, both my students clearly 
recognized something large and irrevocable and unusual was 
happening here, and that this just might be a moment when I would 
have to intervene. And I am thinking, they got THAT right. WHAT 
the hell am I going to do? Is this bozo seriously asking his client to 
confess to a crime in front of us? Okay, but wait a minute, he's talking 
about the wrong case. We know that Mr. Cliente is guilty-if he's 
guilty-of a misdemeanor assault and destruction of property, and 
we're concerned about possible stalking subsequent to the arrest and 
the protective order, but nothing about a car, so .  . . When in doubt, 
when I don't at the moment have any reason to think that my impulse 
is anv more or less strategic or ethical than my students', that is not 
when I'm going to intervene . . .] 
I .  C: Look, Mr. Lawyer, you keep trying to talk to me about a car, 
I keep telling you I don't know what you're talking about, no one 
said nothing about a car. It's just a little problem I had with my 
wife, she's sorry about it now, I know it can all be cleared up, she 
doesn't want me to go to jail. Look, I have to get out of here. I have 
to get to work-I already missed three days of work. Please, can we 
just take care of this.. . 
Mr. D: First of all, buddy, don't call me Mr. Lawyer, that's not my 
name, my name is Bob Defender, I don't know why the hell you 
can't get that straight. . . 
Fearing that continuing the blow-by-blow dialogue will get old, I 
want to fast-forward past the interchange about who was getting 
whose name wrong, and Mr. Cliente's increasingly impassioned pleas 
for Mr. Defender to listen to him, to understand what the case was 
about, to go back into court and make whatever had to happen, 
happen, before he lost his job, and Mr. Defender's rude and sarcastic 
insistence that Pedro better listen to him and so forth, while the three 
prosecutors stand there quite literally speechless. By now I could see 
that it had dawned on Dan and Jennifer that, specifically, what they 
were doing was eavesdropping, more or less by invitation of the 
lawyer, on a lawyer-client consultation; that a large red neon sign 
inside their brains was flashing; and that they were trying to figure out 
what they should be doing, knowing all too well that what they wanted 
to be doing was unceremoniously walking away, or better yet, for me 
to be telling them what they should be doing. 
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I t  was probably only three or four minutes, though it did seem 
longer, before Dan came up with an approach: "Uh, Mr. Defender, 
Mr. Cliente, maybe you'd prefer that we try to talk later about this-" 
Mr. D: Whadyya TALKIN' about, kid? I don't have all day. 
Maybe you only have one lousy case, but I got a lot more important 
cases than this, believe me. . . So, what's it all about? It's a family 
dispute? Take it from me, you don't have the experience yet-it's 
no big deal. I'm sure they're back together. (To Mr. Cliente:) 
Everything going okay with the wife now, buddy? You're living 
together again, right? She just got a little camed away, but you're 
not gonna hold it against her, right? 
Mr. C: Right now we CANT live together. Don't you know? You 
never answer the phone, you never return my calls, I keep trying to 
talk to you about this. My wife of course she wants me home, but 
this case has to be over. It's costing a lot of money for me to stay 
someplace else. You don't care, you don't do nothing- 
Mr. D: Whoa, buddy, listen to me, you're damn lucky I'm talking to 
you now, take it easy-look, just tell us what the situation is and I'm 
telling you, it's gonna get straightened out. We can probably get rid 
of this meatball today, right, guys? (Now turning back toward 
SADAs Ling and Jones, and smiling as if they were good buddies.) 
After all, you may be students, but you look like reasonable people. 
You're not gonna make a federal case out of something like this. 
It's a waste of your time, too, 'cause it's not going anyivhere. You 
wanta get yourselves some experience with some REAL cases, some 
drug cases or something where you can do some hearings, maybe go 
to trial even. Not this piece of garbage.. . (Turning back to Mr. 
Cliente.) Listen, buddy, you have any kind of record? You ever 
been arrested for this kind of thing before? Ever go inside before? 
Mr. C: No, no, I'm not that kind of man, it was a mis- 
understanding- 
Mr. D: (Turning back to SADAS Ling and Jones.) Yeah, okay, see, 
this is a stand-up guy, it was just one of those things, a little 
argument gets out-of-hand and everybody gets upset and now these 
cops, you know how hungry they are for arrests, we're getting a 
million of these family disputes now, all bullsh-t, trust me . . . Look, 
Pedro- 
Mr. C: NOT PEDRO!! My name is JUAN!! 
Mr. D: Okay, jeez, look, just tell these nice people what happened 
with you and your wife so we can get outta here, \vilI you? Come 
on, so you were just going home after a hard day's work . . . 
Mr. C: (Somewhat hesitantly.) Yes, well, no, she was actually the 
one who came home, late you know, much later than she should 
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have.. . She thinks I don't know that she has a boyfriend. She 
thinks I'm jealous for no reason. It's not that. . . 
[As Mr. C continued to recount, soon with gestures, the sequence of 
his beating and threatening his wife and destroying precious 
possessions of hers in the apartment-how, after his release from 
custody and signing the protective order promising to leave his wife 
completely alone, he had promptly proceeded to the home of her 
friend, where she was staying, and chastised her for calling the police 
and making him endure several hours of custody; and how she had 
been ashamed and repentant and promised never to do anything so 
foolish again-I was listening, but with only half a brain. The other 
half kept thinking: Is this really happening? There's no punch-line 
here; this is NOT exculpatory. What does this lawyer think he's 
doing? IS he a lawyer? It actually crossed my mind that some radical 
activists had somehow arranged to have this ringer assigned to 
domestic violence cases, and that everyone else-supervisors, judges, 
probation officers, etc.-who must have seen this lawyer (actor? 
lawyer-impersonator?) in action had decided not to intervene because 
in so many of these cases the defendants richly deserve punishment. 
If this is what I'm thinking, what must my students be thinking? I 
look at them; they appear spell-bound, almost entranced.] Then, with 
a visible effort, SADA Ling pulls out a yellow pad and pen and starts 
taking notes. Go, girl! SADA Jones escalates it a step, even starts 
using some good witness interviewing technique: 
SADA Jones: I'm sorry, Mr. Cliente, just so I'm sure I understand, 
would you mind going back over that part where you picked up the 
telephone and hit her with it-she was on the floor already at that 
point or. . ." 
[Should I be letting him do this?? But the defendant's lawyer is 
right there, he's listening, nodding, even making little facilitative 
interjections like the ones the students learn to use when interviewing 
witnesses-"Sure, right" "So it was like that." He could, of course, 
stop his client from talking, from answering SADA Jones' questions, 
at any moment. Why on earth, what could be going through this 
man's mind?] 
Finally, the defendant's narrative winds down. He actually seems 
somewhat relieved. He has just had, although he doesn't know it, as 
close as he's going to get to his day in court, and like almost everyone 
who becomes embroiled in the litigation process and finally gets to tell 
his own story to someone who ought to be able to translate it into 
justice, he feels better. He looks squarely, with some satisfaction, at 
his lawyer, at SADAs Ling and Jones, at me, obviously feeling 
vindicated, not remorseful or ashamed. His wife had misbehaved; she 
had disrespected him; he had taught her who was boss; she had 
foolishly involved the police; he had shown her what a mistake that 
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had been; there should be no more problems. Now could we all just 
go home?30 
SADA Ling: Okay, well, Mr. Cliente, that's really very helpful.. . 
you know, I think, we could go ahead and get the case called and set 
the case down for trial, SO you can get going back to work and all- 
Mr. D: (Simultaneously, though in different tones) Trial-whaddya 
mean, 
Mr. C: TRIAL? 
Mr. D (continuing): Look, the man just told you, this was a one- 
time thing, his wife does not want to get involved, she's ashamed of 
her own behavior, she loves him and doesn't want him to lose his 
job, much less go to jail, she's never going to show up, you're never 
going to get your corrob, and- 
SADA Ling: Well, actually, Mr. Defender, the complainant in this 
case has already signed a corroborating affidaviel and the People 
are, in fact, ready for trial. (Opening her folder to pull out a copy of 
the corrob, just as we'd planned, albeit in a very different context.) 
Here's another copy for you, we did serve you by mail and file 
several weeks ago, and it's my understanding that the judge intends 
to preclude motions, so I think we need to work out a good trial 
date- 
Mr. C: (Turning to Mr. D.) I don't understand what is going on 
here. Please - 
Mr. D: Don't give me that-You know EXAmLY what's going 
on!" (Grabbing the corrob out of SADA Ling's hands.) That wife 
of yours, she must be feeding you some line-look at this-isn't this 
her signature? She's cooperating with the DAs all the way, it looks 
like. Buddy, you're in trouble. You better talk to this wife of yours, 
or - 
30. Part of the important task of case planning that consumes so much of our time 
and effort in the Clinic involves identifying every possible scenario, both for the 
overall progress of the case and for each component event, and working out, like 
alternative chess games, the branched sequences of moves and countermoves. One of 
our most typical comments in feedback to the new SADAs is that they have focused 
on only one or two potential scenarios and have failed to prepare for several others. 
For once, however, I would not be faulting the two SADAs for not having anticipated 
this turn of events and figured out how to react. In fact, they are responding with 
considerably more aplomb than, at the moment, I could summon. 
31. In New York, for a misdemeanor prosecution to proceed, the People must file 
an accusatory instrument that contains non-hearsay factual allegations which 
establish, if true, "every element of the offense charged and the defendant's 
commission thereof." N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law Q 100.40(l)(c) (McKimey 1992); see also 
id 34 100.15,170.10(4)(a), 170.65. Typically, in New York City, this is accomplished 
by having the victim of the crime read a misdemeanor complaint containing hearsay 
allegations by the arresting officer and "corroborate" those allegations by signing an 
affidavit to that effect, colloquially referred to as "the corrob." 
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[At this point-as Mr. Defender starts advising his client to again 
violate the court's Order of Protection prohibiting any contact with 
the victim, and suggesting to him that the victim could terminate the 
prosecution-for safety reasons I will step in, without ambivalence. 
But just before I do, SADA Jones does, with astounding presence of 
mind, artfully speaking to the defendant without addressing him, even 
though by now it seems clear that his counsel has implicitly consented 
to our direct contact with his client.] 
SADA Jones: Mr. Defender, I'm sure you realize that continuation 
of this prosecution has nothing to do with Ms. Victim. It's 
completely out of her hands; it's up to us. All this corroborating 
affidavit means is that she told the truth. She was asked to sign this 
by the police. Everything on this paper is the same, pretty much, as 
what your client has just said. And I know you don't mean to direct 
Mr. Cliente to violate the judge's order not to contact his wife, and 
to risk prosecution for a felony-32 
There was more, but this is sufficient to convey the essence of the 
problem. Mr. Defender had just single-handedly converted a possible 
dismissal into an airtight case by inducing his client to provide the 
prosecution with a full confession, seemingly with the reckless 
abandon of a lawyer who had never spoken with his client about the 
case before turning us loose on him. In the process, he had also 
turned a flamethrower on any potential plea-bargaining bridges, 
including denigrating his adversaries as students and with a crude 
ethnic slur, and indicating his utter disdain for family violence 
prosecutions. We already knew that Mr. Defender didn't return our 
calls and didn't show up in court; it sounded as if he was equally 
unresponsive to his client's efforts to confer with him. Even in the 
lamentable conditions of New York City Criminal Court, where 
defendants like Mr. Cliente who, working at a minimum wage job, 
cannot afford private counsel and often receive suboptimal 
representation, Mr. Defender was well off the chart. What, if 
anything, did this mean for us as prosecutors? 
As we headed back to the office after setting the case down for trial 
(without so much as a grumble from Mr. Defender about the court's 
preclusion of any pretrial motions as ~nt imely)?~ we began to talk 
about what had just happened. The students, as well as their 
supervisor, were still taking it all in. 
32. As may be evident, one technique for trying to protect the victim of domestic 
violence from retaliation or other pressure to "drop charges" is emphasizing, 
whenever possible in the hearing of the defendant, that the victim's role is limited to 
that of a fact witness and that she cannot control the course of the prosecution. 
33. See id. §§255.10,255.20 (mandating that all pre-trial motions be served within 
forty-five days after arraignment on the accusatory instrument). 
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So, we suspended the afternoon's other planned business (the 
essence of clinical teaching is seizing the teachable momentu) to 
process the many inputs we had just received. On one level, there was 
the information from and about Mr. Cliente to absorb: out of his own 
mouth, with his lawyer standing by urging him on:s he had just 
convicted himself not only of the original misdemeanor charge, but of 
violation of an outstanding court order of protectionab that quite 
possibly constituted an indictable felony." Even though people 
accused of family violence do tend to make inculpatory admissions 
because their lack of insight and sense of righteous superiority often 
make them eager to explain-not that they hadn? committed the 
charged conduct, but that their doing so was justified-even so, this 
extreme a version of the phenomenon didn't happen everyday. 
On a second level, certainly our qualms about having reasonable 
cause to continue the prosecution3 had vanished. They had been 
34. See, e.g., Fran Quigley, Seizing [Ire Disorienri~~g Moment Adrtlr Learning 
Theory and the Teaching of Social Justice in L o ~ v  Sd~ool  Clinics. 2 Clinical L Rev. 37, 
39-44 (1995) (describing the efficacy of intense clinical experiences for teaching of 
values and ethical judgment). 
35. The significance of this is, absent the attorney's consent, our direct questioning 
of Mr. Cliente would have: (1) constituted a stark violation of N.Y. Code, atpra note 
13, DR 7-104 ("During the course of the representation of a client a lawyer shall not 
[clommunicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the representation 
with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by a lawyer in that matter unless the 
lawyer has the prior consent of the lawyer representing such other party or is 
authorized by lawv to do so."); and (2) elicited no usable admissions because of the 
stringent rule prohibiting uncounseled questioning of represented defendants once a 
criminal proceeding has commenced. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201,205- 
06 (1964) (holding that after commencement of a criminal action, questioning the 
defendant without counsel present violates the Sisth Amendment); People v. 
Samuels, 49 N.Y.2d 218, 222-23 (N.Y. 1980) (holding that after commencement of 
criminal action, any statements obtained from a defendant without a latkyer present 
are inadmissible, and that Miranda rights cannot be waived wvithout assistance of 
counsel). 
36. N.Y. Crirn. Proc. Law 5 530.12 (McKinney 1992). An order of protection can 
be tailored to include various provisions; all orders prohibit threatening, harassing. 
assaulting, or intimidating the wvitness. In the family contest, most "full" orders of 
protection also forbid the defendant to go near the witness andlor her children, or her 
home, place of business, church, the children's daycare center or school, etc. See Lee 
H. Elkins & Jane Fosbinder, New York Law of Domestic Violence 75169 (199s & 
1999 Supp.) 
37. Any violation of an order of protection is also a new. independent offensc of 
contempt. Usually, it is a misdemeanor, but if it includes commission of another 
crime, such as assault or stalking or menacing, it is automatically elevated to a felony 
charge of criminal contempt in the first degree or aggravated criminal contempt. N.Y. 
Penal Law §§215.51(b), 215.52 (McKinney 1999); see also Newv York Law of 
Domestic Violence, supra note 36, at 823-28. 
3 8  See N.Y. Code, supra note 13, DR 7-103(A) ("A public prosecutor. . . shall 
not institute or cause to be instituted criminal charges when he or she know or it is 
obvious that the charges are not supported by probable cause."); see also ABA 
Standards for Criminal Justice Prosecution Function and Defense Function 3-3.9(a) 
(1993) ("A prosecutor should not institute, or cause to be instituted, or pennit the 
continued pendency of criminal charges when the prosecutor knows that the charges 
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replaced, however, with the far more puzzling quandary of what, if 
anything, we ought to do about Mr. Defender. 
I wish that I could reproduce the dialogue in the office that 
afternoon as the two SADAs on the case first re-enacted, with 
verisimilitude, the incident in the corridor for their other SADA 
colleagues, and then talked and argued through the issues for several 
hours as a group. It was a classic example of the kind of experiential 
self-teaching, peer teaching, and teaching through supervision, that is 
so difficult to replicate in a classroom, whether by hypothetical or 
simulation. New lawyers who are introduced to comparable issues in 
the classroom (1) simply don't believe things like this happen, and 
view the hypothetical or simulation as an outlandish concoction of the 
fevered academic brain; and/or (2) assume or imagine the existence of 
much simpler solutions than in fact are available (e.g., "I would call 
his supervisor and ask to have another lawyer assigned to the case9'- 
as if such a request from a prosecutor might not be taken by a defense 
supervisor as grounds for accolade, not removal; as if the supervisor 
had a reservoir of spare lawyers; as if the 18-B Panel Administrator 
would be happy to oblige). One virtue of teaching through real cases 
is that it confronts the new lawyer with "you can't make this stuff up" 
issues, and precludes the facile resolutions that seem so alluring in the 
abstract and are so unattainable in reality.39 
The task was to move beyond exclamations of disbelief and get the 
SADAs thinking analytically and systematically. Using our basic 
protocol for quality decision-making, we would start by identifying 
objectives; move on to brainstorming the broadest array of 
conceivable options; try to sort out the pros and cons of each option; 
are not supported by probable cause [or]. . . in the absence of sufficient admissible 
evidence to support a conviction."). 
Most prosecutors describe this as the most difficult ethical responsibility they face 
because it entails an adjudicatory role that is not comfortable for most lawyers. For 
an impressive description of a prosecutor's reaching the painful conclusion that there 
was too great a risk that his robbery victim's identification of the defendant was 
mistaken, and therefore dismissing a very winnable case, see Kenneth J. Melilli, 
Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversary System, 1992 B W  L. Rev. 669,702 n.266. 
Note that one factor in Professor Melilli's decision to halt the prosecution was his 
concern about the caliber of the defendant's counsel. 
39. See Steven Hartwell, Promoting Moral Development Through Experiential 
Teaching, 1 Clinical L. Rev. 505, 505-06 (1995); Ian Johnstone & Mary Patricia 
Treuthart, Doing the Right Thing: An Overview of Teaching Professional 
Responsibility, 41 J .  Legal Educ. 75, 92-95 (1991); David Luban & Michael 
Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark Times, 9 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 
31,50 (1995); see ako Steven H. Leleiko, Love, Professional Responsibility, The Rule 
of Law, and Clinical Legal Education, 29 Clev. St. L. Rev. 641,649-56 (1980); David 
A. J. Richards, Moral Theory, The Developmental Psychology of Ethical Autonomy 
and Professionalism, 31 J. Legal Educ. 359,372-73 (1981) (noting the importance of 
reciprocal role-playing in clinical and class settings to develop students' real legal 
experience and moral awareness). 
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and make our choices.-1° The first step led to some quick conclusions: 
we wanted to protect the complainant, who was clearly at risk from a 
man who believed that his exertion of control over her by physical 
violence and domination was legitimate; at the same time, we wanted 
to discharge our professional duty within the criminal justice system. 
Although no one in the group initially framed that duty as including a 
potential obligation to report Mr. Defender to any authority, there 
was discomfort and concern that an indigent defendant could be stuck 
with this lawyer. 
B.  Was Mr. Defender Just Having a Bad Day? 
A good preliminary point was raised by one of the SADAs who 
wasn't on the case but had heard our description of the lawyer's 
behavior. Could it be that we had seen an aberration, that for 
whatever reason Mr. Defender had simply lost it today, that in the 
future (admittedly, after the horse had not just left but tom down the 
barn) he would revert to a vigilant guardian of his client" rights and 
interests? Without being sure that an affirmative answer would 
change the analysis, this SADA thought we needed more than a set of 
one event to justify almost any action we might undertake. 
After all, every lawyer, the best and the most esperienced, makes 
lots of mistakes. Because the raw material of our craft is basically 
human behavior, not organic tissue or inert matter, we are even more 
likely to commit harmful error than the physician or the engineer, 
both of whom make their fair share. A refreshing aspect of the long 
slow struggle that begins anew each year with each cadre of clinical 
students is assisting at the birth of their painful, humbling, yet 
ultimately relieved realization that even if they are as meticulous and 
methodical and insightful as we urge them to be, they are condemned 
to perpetrate untold numbers of serious mistakes-and that they are 
not alone.41 
40. This variation on the scientific method, in the sense that generating and testing 
hypotheses are its constituent moves, is the template of the "problem-solving" or 
"clinical judgment" that many clinical teachers consider as our centnl educational 
objective. See Legal Education and Professional Development-An Educational 
Continuum, Report of the Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing 
the Gap, 1992 ABA Sec. Legal Educ. & Admission to the Bar 141-51 (detailing the 
skills and concepts involved in problem-solving, including identifying and diagnosing 
a problem, generating alternative solutions and strategies, and developing a plan of 
action); Anthony G. Amsterdam. Clinical Legal Edtlcarion-A 2lsr-Cenrr~ry 
Perspective, 34 J .  Legal Educ. 612,612-13 (1984) (describing systematic approach that 
ought to be taught in law school); see ako Mark Neal Awonson, We Ask Yor~ To 
Consider: Learning About Practical Judgnlenr in Lawlyering, 4 Clinical I.. Rev. 247, 
248 (1998) (discussing ways in which "professional judgment" is differentiated from 
"expert knowledge, systematic thinking, intuition, or common sense," and identifying 
the "core role of the lawyer" as a "problem solver," defining the key curricular goal of 
clinics as fostering the development of good lawyering judgment). 
41. The literature of confessed professional error has become abundant, but for 
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From one isolated encounter, then, it might not be prudent to 
assume that Mr. Defender was as completely out-of-control and bereft 
of basic lawyering skills as he appeared to be. 
Gathering additional information is generally an aspect of problem- 
solving that clinical teachers like to reinforce, and it took only a few 
probing questions (Who would be a reliable source on this? Who 
would be familiar with Mr. Defender's conduct in other cases at other 
times, for example?) to elicit the idea of e-mailing our colleagues 
within the DA's office to see whether anyone else could recall a 
notable experience with Mr. Defender. (Even before e-mail, 
institutional lawyers often used memos or scuttlebutt to check out 
office-wide perceptions of opposing witnesses and lawyers or judges.) 
Typically, such an inquiry will garner three or four responses- 
maybe six. In short order, we had three times that. Apparently, while 
my ADA co-teacher, who had been handling only felonies before 
starting in the Clinic, had been spared prior contact with Mr. 
Defender, many other assistants hadn't been so lucky. The tales, even 
schematized for e-mail, were lurid and bizarre. Abuse of clients and 
utter non-responsiveness to attempts at contact were dominant 
themes. Phrases from staid ADAs like "the man is WILD!", "off on 
another planet," "shoots from the hip, usually at his own foot," 
suggested that our experience was far from unique. One ADA 
recalled Mr. Defender's arriving at his office and dropping off a 
client-"offering him up," as the ADA put it- to turn confidential 
informant in a fairly large drug case; the lawyer had not only left his 
client alone with the ADA, but, it soon became apparent, had not 
prepared or counseled the man about any of the implications, legal or 
practical, of providing information to be used against major drug 
lords. 
None of these responses, however, indicated that any ADA had 
thought it proper or necessary to notify any authority about Mr. 
Defender's conduct. No one mentioned having raised the issue of his 
competence with a judge presiding over one of his client's cases, or 
with the administrator responsible for his continuing representation of 
indigent defendants. 
Now I want to switch gears away from the narrative and review the 
various issues, analyses, and sources of guidance that we considered 
along the way to our decision. 
me, the classic of the genre is Dr. David Hilfiker's beautifully written volume, Healing 
the Wounds: A Physician Looks at His Work (1985). The most compelling chapter is 
Mistakes, a reprint of Facing Our Mistakes, a shockingly honest reflection on n 
number of errors in the doctor's own practice which seriously damaged patients, first 
published at 310 New Eng. J. Med. 118 (1984). 
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11. THE PROSECUTOR'S RESPONSIBILITIES WHEN 
DEFENSE COUNSEL IS INEFFECTIVE OR INCOMPETENT 
A. Must a Prosecutor Intervene? 
In the earliest treatment of this issue that we could hnd, Professor 
Monroe Freedman,J2 citing the example of an unlicensed defense 
counsel, seemed to take it for granted that a prosecutor must advise a 
trial court if, in the prosecutor's view, the defense lawyer is rendering 
ineffective assistance to the defendant. He does not, however, suggest 
what rule or rationale supports this assumption, and he does not 
suggest that mere incompetence would compel inter~ention?~ (At 
trial, of course, the judge is in about as good a position to detect the 
ineffective assistance as the prosecutor, although the latter might 
register some nuances that escape the judge.) However, Professor 
Freedman reports anecdotally that on the contrary, prosecutors 
concerned about a low level of defense counsel performance in a 
particular case deliberately insert praise of the defense lawyer's 
acumen into their summations, to insulate the resulting convictions 
from Sixth Amendment attack. 
Not that, in general, prosecutors have much to fear from such an 
attack, as was so powerfully demonstrated in Judge David Bazelon's 
magnificent and still unmatched jeremiad on America's failure, at 
least in the criminal realm, to "assure that our adversary system of 
justice really is adversary and really does j~s t ice ."~  
42. Howard Lichtenstein Distinguished Professor of Legal Ethics at Hofstra Law 
School, and one of the most formidable scholars in the field of legal ethics. 
43. Monroe H. Freedman, Lawyers' Ethics in an Adversary System 89 (1975); 
published in an earlier version as Monroe H. Freedman. The Professional 
Responsibility of the Prosecuting Attorney, 55 Geo. LJ. 1030.1039-40 (1967). 
44. David L. Bazelon, The Defective Assisrance of Colmsel, 42 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1.2 
(1973) (For the younger readers, Judge Bazelon was Chief Judge of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia and an extraordinary visionary about 
the need for procedural safeguards, including especially competent, well-trained 
lawyers with adequate resources to protect the rights of the poor, the mentally 
compromised, and other disadvantaged people). This article evoked much 
controversy when published because it was one of the first, and remains one of the 
most powerful, condemnations of the quality of counsel provided to poor people by 
the assigned counsel system-and I think it worth quoting at length. because in my 
opinion, absolutely no one has ever put it better. Judge Bmlon. reporting the 
coinage of a phrase that has become part of the common currency of discourse about 
criminal justice: 
The adversary system assumes that each side has adequate counsel. This 
assumption probably holds true for giant corporations or well-to-do 
individuals, but what I have seen in 23 years on the bench leads me to 
believe that a great many-if not most-indigent defendants do not receive 
the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed them by the 6th 
Amendment. . . . There are no statistics to illustrate the scope of the problem 
because, as I shall demonstrate, the criminal justice system goes to 
considerable lengths to bury the problem. But no one could seriously 
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Judge Bazelon devotes only a page to the prosecutor's contribution 
to the prevalence of the "defective assistance of counsel."45 He sees 
no incentives for a prosecutor to refrain from taking advantage of the 
widespread gross inadequacies of appointed defense lawyers, noting 
that given the paucity of reversals of conviction on such grounds, 
prosecutors are not likely to "think twice."46 
The next analysis we located is a two-page discussion in Professor 
Fisher's major article, In Search of the Virtuous Pro~ecutor."~ 
Professor Fisher posits the hypothetical of the "incompetent defense 
counsel" who betrays, in the course of plea bargaining, apparent 
unawareness of a strong suppression issue that might lead to dismissal 
(interestingly enough, based on experience with a clinical law student 
placed in a prosecutor's office).48 He points out that "[p]rosecutors 
are uniquely positioned to observe incompetent and lazy 
representation of  defendant^,"^^ and asks, "Should the prosecutor. . . 
inform the authorities of [defense counsel's] inc~mpetence?"~~ His 
response is, in essence, that the answer is unclear. He seems inclined 
dispute that ineffective assistance is a common phenomenon. A very able 
trial judge described some of the counsel coming before the courts as 
"walking violations of the sixth amendment." 
.... 
Much like the provision of medical care to the poor, the provision of legal 
counsel to the indigent is a non-prestigious activity that the public and the 
profession would rather not think about. Just as we assume our medical 
responsibility is met when we provide poor people a hospital, no matter how 
shabby, undermanned and underfunded, so we pretend to do justice by 
providing an indigent defendant with a lawyer, no matter how 
inexperienced, incompetent or indifferent. 
Id. at 4. 
Judge Bazelon then describes some classic cases, including the defense lawyer who 
didn't lrnow that courts maintain records of prior convictions; the one who told the 
judge he'd sum up in ten minutes to avoid getting a parking ticket; the lawyer who 
spent all of fifteen minutes with his client before pleading him guilty to a capital 
offense, despite the client's claim of exculpatory witnesses; the trial counsel who met 
the client for the first time on the way to court on the morning of trial and had 
"virtually no acquaintance" with the facts of the case; and, of course, the renowned 
case of the lawyer who slept soundly through the examination of the prosecution 
witnesses. Id. at 2-3,11,21,30. He also presents the various archetypes of defective 
counsel, including the "regulars," the "sweetheart" lawyers who depend on judges for 
continued appointments and a high volume of modest fees, and who try to oblige the 
judges by "moving along" their crowded calendars with no motions, no investigations, 
and quick pleas; the "uptown lawyers" who are clueless and unenthusiastic about 
criminal practice but, with distaste, accept a defense appointment as a matter of duty; 
and the neophytes trying their first cases who "not only [don't] know what to do next; 
[they don't] know what to do first." Id. at 7-16. 
45. Id. at 14-15. 
46. Id. 
47. Stanley Z .  Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A Conceptual 
Framework, 15 Am J. Crim. L. 197,222-23 (1988). 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 222. 
50. Id. at 222 n.124. 
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to consider more seriously the possibility of trying to "compensate" 
for the defender's limitations by, e.g., alerting him to the Fourth 
Amendment problem than by reporting the malfeasance. 
Writing a year after Professor Fisher, another important 
commentator with real prosecutorial experience, Professor Bruce 
Green, concludes that prosecutors ought to become their "brother's 
keepers" when confronted with the situation of the defense lawyer 
who may have conflicting interests in the representation of a 
particular defendant.5l Using four illustrative cases in which courts 
instructed prosecutors to intervene, Professor Green cogently reasons 
that the prosecutor's obligation to "do justice" entails a responsibility 
"to ensure that a criminal defendant is not unjustly convicted and that 
the proceedings leading up to a conviction are fair,"= and that an 
independent, conflict-free lawyer is a necessary element of a fair 
proceeding as well as a specific right guaranteed by the Six-th 
Amendment promise of the assistance of c o ~ n s e l . ~  He also seizes on 
a correlative aspect of the prosecutor's role-the "administrator of 
justice"-as the locus of an "aErmative responsibility to promote the 
orderly, efficient administration of criminal justice,'%cluding "a duty 
to avoid missteps that will result in reversals of criminal convictions 
and necessitate retrials."% He has no trouble finding a broad duty to 
advise both defense counsel and the trial court of perceived or 
potential conflicts, such as a defense lawyer's having previously 
represented a prosecution witness,ss or being accused of wrong-doing 
by a prosecution witne~s.5~ Even when the defense lawyer is well 
aware of the potential problem, and presumably has taken 
appropriate steps to address it, Professor Green declares that the 
prosecutor must still alert the trial court, and may even be required to 
file a formal disqualification motion to ensure that the court will give 
it sufficient attention and that the defendant will be properly advised 
of the potential ramifications of the defense lawyer's continuing 
representati~n.~ 
Professor Green deals only briefly with the situation in which the 
defense lawyer is compromised in ability or zeal rather than 
integrity.58 "[Wlhen it becomes apparent that defense counsel may be 
51. Green, Her Brother's Keeper, supra note 18, at 365. 
5 2  Id at 324. 
53. Id at 341 ("The right to counsel prevents the State from conducting trials at 
which persons who face incarceration must defend themselves without adequate legal 
assistance." (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan. 446 U.S. 335.344 (1980))). 
54. Id at 325. 
55. Id at 332-38 (discussing, for example, United States v. Mitchell, 572 F. Supp. 
709 (N.D. Cal. 1983)). 
56. Id at 338-45 (discussing, for example, Mannhalt v. Reed, 837 F2d 576 (9th 
Cu. 1988)). 
57. Id at 365-66. 
5 8  See id at 341-42. 
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denying the accused adequate legal assistance, the prosecutor, as a 
representative of the State, should take reasonably available steps to 
remedy the problem."59 As Professor Green observes, such an 
obligation cannot be grounded in anything explicit in either of the 
major ethical codes. However, he does quote the far less authoritative 
American Lawyer's Code of Conduct: "A lawyer serving as public 
prosecutor, who knows that a defendant is not receiving or has not 
received effective assistance of counsel, shall promptly advise the 
court, on the record when possible"60 and cites language from one of 
the first ineffective assistance opinions about the "duty of 
the . . . prosecution to observe . . . and correct [ineffective 
repre~entation]."~~ Again, as in Professor Freedman's article, 
Professor Green's focus is on the need to act when defense counsel is 
constitutionally ineffective, rather than merely incompetent. 
The strongest case for the prosecutor's duty to intervene after 
recognizing incompetence on the part of defense counsel is made by 
Professor Fred Zacharias in his comprehensive article, Structuring the 
Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial P r a ~ t i c e . ~ ~  Professor Zacharias views the 
lazy, or temporarily incapacitated, or generally incompetent, or 
grossly unprepared defense lawyer as a potentially fatal defect in the 
truth-producing machine of the adversary system more than as an 
abrogation of the Sixth Amendment rights of a defendant. 63 Instead 
of using ineffective assistance as the threshold for intervention, 
Professor Zacharias identifies a working adversarial system as the sine 
qua non of the "justice" that prosecutors are sworn to uphold. That, 
in turn, presumes something like a level playing field for the 
government and the defendant in terms of the quality of their 
attorneys and other  resource^.^ 
Professor Zacharias does an excellent job of explaining why the 
theoretical guarantees of a level playing field are far from reliable. 
Market forces simply have no place in this realm; the vast majority of 
criminal defendants have zero capacity, either in liquid assets or in life 
- -- - 
59. Id. 
60. Id. at 342 n.79. 
61. Id. citing Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 670 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 
889 (1945) (defining the "absence of effective representation [i.e., ineffective 
assistance of counsel]" as "representation so lacking in competence that it becomes 
the duty of the court or the prosecution to observe it and correct it"); see also In re 
Wolfram, 847 P.2d 94, 104-06 (Ariz. 1993) (Martone, J., concurring) (stating that the 
trial judge and prosecutor had duty to report inadequate representation of criminal 
defense counsel to disciplinary authorities (citing Arizona equivalent of DR 1-103(A), 
but with no discussion or other authority)). 
62. Zacharias, Stmcturing the Ethics, supra note 18; see also Fred C.  Zacharias, 
Justice in Plea Bargaining, 39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1121,1164-76 (1998) [hereinafter 
Zacharias, Justice in Plea Bargaining]. 
63. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics, supra note 18.. 
64. Id. at 61. 
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skills, for selecting and retaining competent counsel.bs Judicial 
oversight, in theory the preferable alternative to prosecutorial 
intervention, cannot be relied upon both because the dwindling supply 
of willing counsel tends to limit judicial choice when it comes to 
appointment or suspension of eligibility for appointment," and 
because too many judges, consciously or subliminally, prefer the less 
aggressive advocate who cooperates in disposing of cases and helping 
to clear the judge's docket.67 Appellate courts, as Professor Zacharias 
explains, demonstrate an "institutional reluctancevw to reverse 
convictions for ineffective assistance, which requires the convicted 
defendant to meet an almost impossible standard.bY Moreover, 
65. Some of the private lawyers who command the highest fees are among the 
worst. Professor Zacharias does not really address whether and how the dynamics of 
the prosecutor's duty vis-a-vis an appalling privately retained attorney would change, 
but given the minuscule proportion such lawvyers constitute of the defense bar. it is 
hardly a gaping hole in his analysis. Cf: Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335,34345 (1980) 
(holding that constitutional sufficiency of legal assistance provided by retaincd 
counsel in criminal case must be measured by the same standard applied to 
representation by court-appointed counsel). 
66. In some jurisdictions, like the City of New York, fewer and fewer attorneys 
are willing to accept appointment as defense counsel, and there is little reason to 
think that those who do constitute the flower of the defense bar. The refusal of the 
New York State Governor and Legislature for over fourteen years to increase the 
remuneration for appointed defense counsel from the absurd level of $40 per hour for 
in-court time and $25 per hour for out-of-court work is blamed for the unavailability 
of appointed counsel to handle "conflict" and other cases that cannot be handled by 
the institutional defenders, such as the Legal Aid Society or hlanhattan Defenders. 
"A crisis exists in our criminal and family courts, resulting from the entirely 
inadequate compensation that assigned counsel are paid." according to Deputy Chief 
Administrative Judge for Justice Initiatives of the New York Unified Court System 
Juanita Bing Newton. John Caher, No Move ro Raise IS-B Rnres Expecred from 
Albany, N.Y. L.J., June 7,2000, at 1. Even the president-elect of the Nev: York State 
District Attorneys Association supports increasing the level of compensation, noting 
that convictions could be overturned and new trials required because of valid 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Id; see afso Def.'s Supplemental hlem. in 
Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n v. Pataki, (No. 102937i00) 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct.) [hereinafter Def.'s Supplemental Mem.] (pleading on file with the 
author) (presenting a novel civil action alleging deprivation of the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel because of the inadequate compensation offered to court-appointed 
criminal defense lawyers and consequent mass defection of high-quality lawyers from 
the appointment panel). 
67. See Zacharias, Structuring rile Erl~icr, supra note 18, at 66-67. 
68. Id at 67. 
69. Merely establishing that the defense lawyer failed to provide minimally 
acceptable representation is not sufficient. The defendant must show that. but for the 
substandard representation, there is at least a "reasonable probability that.. . the 
result.. . would have been different." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 665, 694 
(1984). 
This standard focuses not on whether the defense counsel was minimally 
competent, or performed the basic functions contemplated by the Sixth Amendment 
guarantee of counsel in criminal cases, but instead on what the Supreme Court deems 
the threshold question of the defendant's factual guilt. Assuming that the evidentiary 
record supporting a finding of guilt would not be significantly different had an 
effective defense lawyer been on the case-an indefensible assumption-reviewing 
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obtaining relief on appeal is hardly a substitute for justice at the trial 
level, given the impacts on family, job, etc. of a criminal conviction, 
the distinct likelihood of serving all or most of a sentence before an 
appeal is decided, and the disadvantage of facing a retrial long after 
courts have countenanced hideous and ludicrous travesties of lawyering. See Martin 
C. Calhoun, Note, How to Thread the Needle: Toward a Checklist-Based Standard for 
Evaluating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 77 Geo. L.J. 413,425-32 (1988). 
In a survey of all federal ineffective assistance claims reviewed by circuit courts 
between the Strickland decision in 1984 and May 1988, it was found that counsel's 
perfonnance was "professionally reasonable" in only 54.3% of the cases; however, 
only 4.3% of the cases resulted in reversals because pursuant to Strickland, courts first 
had to find "prejudice," i.e., that the result was not "just." Id. at 430-31. In effect, 
Stricklnnd means that the "factually guilty" defendant does not deserve the same right 
to effective assistance of counsel as the "innocent" defendant. Id. at 428-30. 
Even lawyers who have been disbarred or suspended because of their 
incapacitation while representing a defendant are nonetheless deemed effective. See 
Timothy J. Lucey, Comment, Bellamy v. Cogdell: The Ethical Implications of Claims 
of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 6 Geo. J .  Legal Ethics 549, 550-51 (1993). The 
Second Circuit refused to reverse a conviction on ineffective assistance grounds 
despite the fact that defense counsel, who had come out of retirement to conduct the 
criminal trial, was simultaneously charged with disciplinary violations, and had 
responded by seeking lengthy adjournment of the disciplinary hearing because health 
problems "incapacitated" him. Id. at 561-62. Counsel had also promised to associate 
a "competent attorney" to assist him in the trial if the court would delay his 
suspension from practice until after the trial. Counsel, however, never informed the 
defendant of the pending disciplinary charges, his admitted incapacity, or his promise 
not to try the case by himself, but proceeded to try the case without co-counsel. He 
was suspended two months later. The trial judge held a post-conviction hearing on 
the ineffective assistance claim, but refused to require the defense lawyer to testify, 
and sustained the verdict. Id.; accord State v. Green, 643 A.2d 18,20 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1994) (holding no ineffective assistance when lawyer conducted trial while 
suspended and suffering from alcohol and drug dependency leading to lawyer's arrest 
for possession of cocaine just after verdict); Commonwealth v. Vance, 546 A.2d 632, 
637-39 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (holding no ineffective assistance when attorney was 
disbarred two months after defendant pleaded guilty, and also had been using cocaine 
during the representation); see also United States v. Mouzin, 785 F.2d 682,696-98 (9th 
Cir. 1986) (holding that disbarment during trial does not constitute ineffective 
assistance); United States v. Dumas, 796 F. Supp. 42, 46-47 (D. Mass. 1992) 
(indicating that representation at trial by "lawyer" who had never been admitted in 
the jurisdiction (although once admitted in a different state) and who conducted 
unauthorized practice for almost eleven years, using fabricated registration numbers 
for papers filed in federal court, does not constitute ineffective assistance under the 
StrickLlnd test); People v. Allen, 580 N.E.2d 1291, 1300-01 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) 
(holding that pending disbarment during trial, and disbarment before post-trial 
hearings, did not constitute ineffective assistance); State v. Smith, 476 N.W.2d 511, 
513 (Minn. 1991) (maintaining that suspension of counsel is not equivalent to 
ineffective assistance). 
This is one societal injustice that legal scholars have well and truly documented. 
See, e.g., a trilogy of devastating articles by Touro Law Professor Richard Klein: The 
Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the Constitzctional Right to 
Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 Hastings Const. L.Q. 625 (1986) [hereinafter Klein, 
The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes]; The Relationship of the Colrrt and Defense 
Counsel, supra note 11; The Eleventh Commandment: Thou Shalt Not be Compelled to 
Render the Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 68 Ind. L.J. 363 (1993); see also Bruce A. 
Green, Lethal Fiction: The Meaning of "Counsel" in the Sixth Amendment, 78 Iowa L. 
Rev. 433 (1993). 
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the offense. (Despite the general view that prosecutors suffer and 
defendants profit from delay, it can be problematic for a defense case 
too.) As Professor Zacharias notes, "[rleacting to incompetent 
defense representation before a verdict is rendered may presente the 
integrity of the trial process in a way that appeals cannot."'" 
In discussing slightly less egregious cases-where "[dlefense counsel 
performs, but very badly," or appears to perform well, but to the 
prosecutor's uniquely sensitive eye, is missing important tactical 
opportunities71-Professor Zacharias seems ambivalent. He strains to 
show that even the latter category might, under rare circumstances, be 
considered ineffective a~sistance.~ From Professor Zacharias" 
discussion, it is not entirely clear whether he would invoke the 
prosecutor's duty to act: (1) whenever the representation is 
insuEiciently adversarial in the prosecutor's view; or (2) instead, only 
when it is atrocious enough to conform with the caselaw's definition of 
ineffective assistance. 
Initially, Professor Zacharias uses phrases like a lack of "building 
blocks of the adversary system" and "valid competitive adjudication" 
to describe the kind of problem that requires prosecutorial 
re~tification.~~ He suggests that the prosecutor's "duty to step out of 
the advocate's role" to "help restore adversarial balance" is triggered 
whenever a defendant is deprived of "what constitutes a fair trial: one 
in which an innocent defendant has a full opportunity for 
vindication.. . ."74 (I think the meaning here is not that this very 
defendant must be factually "innocent," in the sense that Strickland 
seems to demand Sixth Amendment-compliant representation only 
for the innocent, but rather that the quality of the representation 
should be high enough to enable this defendant, IF innocent, to 
escape conviction.) Later, Professor Zacharias describes the 
breakdown of adversarial justice "\vhen a criminal defense attorney 
70. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics, supra note 18, at 69. 
71. Even more imperative is intervening to "level the playing Geld" between 
prosecutor and ineffectivelincompetent defense counsel prior to trial or when no trial 
is contemplated, i.e. in plea bargaining. See Zacharias, Jtisrice in Plea Bargaining, 
supra note 62. In this later article, Professor Zacharias juxtaposes a variety of 
theoretical rationales for prosecutorial plea offers. Some of these theories could 
permit the prosecutor to take full advantage of defense counsel's lapses; others would 
allow a prosecutor to offer only the plea that a fully informed, uncoerced, well- 
represented defendant would be offered. Surprisingly. Professor Zacharias 
acknowledges with some sympathy the distaste prosecutors feel for having to report 
an ineffective defender to the court, and suggests ways to avoid this duty, e.g. by 
offering a deal that is "too good for the defendant" to p a s  up. Id. at 1169. In any 
event, reliance on disclosure to the court as a remedy seems self-contradictory given 
Professor Zacharias' description of the court's limited options upon disclosure. See 
infra note 85. 
72  Id at 70 n.111. 
73. Id at 61-62. 
74. Id at 64-65. 
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does not even roughly match the prosecutor's talents or fails to 
represent his client's interests" as "a one-sided ~ontest."'~ 
All of these formulations of the "trigger" for prosecutorial action 
amount to a far cry from the "eye of the needle" test,"j and suggests 
that it would take less abysmal failure by a defense lawyer, in 
Professor Zacharias' view, to invoke the prosecutor's duty to 
intervene than it would to reverse a conviction. Yet, ultimately he 
seems to accept the notion that as long as the defense lawyer stays 
within "the wide range of professionally competent assistance,"-i.e., 
if the representation is not bad enough to warrant reversal-the 
prosecutor has no reason, and no responsibility, to act at all?' It is 
only in regard to the most obvious case-when the presiding judge 
either is or chooses to be unaware of the defense counsel's 
deficiencies, and those deficiencies are plainly of a magnitude that 
amounts to "essentially no representation" (e.g., the drunk, senile, or 
clueless defender) that Professor Zacharias suggests action is 
req~ired.7~ Because of the prosecutor's inherent role in the criminal 
justice process, her duty "to do justice," she cannot "passively accept 
systelnically faulty outcomes;"79 rather, the prosecutor must consider 
"whether she is in a unique position to perceive and remedy the 
systemic breakdown before a one-sided trial results"80 and, if so, she 
must "undertake remedial steps."s1 
Professor Zacharias describes a range of these "steps." One could 
attempt to restore the adversarial balance of power either by pulling 
some prosecutorial punches-which would only render the proceeding 
less adversarial, not more fairly so-or through outright assistance to 
the defendant by mustering favorable evidence or raising neglected 
issues. This approach, Professor Zacharias fears, would be logistically 
cumbersome and unfairly detrimental to the effective and logical 
presentation of the People's case. Defense counsel's limitations might 
not surface until after the People's direct case; only then would the 
failed cross-examination or forgone defense case become evident, and 
it would seem strange and confusing for the prosecutor to devote the 
crucial final stage of trial-her rebuttal-to highlighting sources of 
reasonable doubt. Moreover, over time, defense lawyers who caught 
on to this potential windfall of positive evidence at the end of the case 
would be induced to refrain from cross-examination or presenting 
75. Id. at 66. 
76. Calhoun, supra note 69. 
77. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics, wcpra note 18, at 69 (quoting Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668,690 (1984)). 
78. Id. at 68-69. Professor Zacharias also points out that in every contest of two, 
it's to be expected that one or the other is or will appear to be somewhat less talented 
or active, that absolute equality of adversaries is never achieved. Id. at 68. 
79. Id. at 64. 
80. Id. at 70. 
81. Id. at 69. 
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their defense, knowing that it would ring far more persuasively to the 
fact-finder if it came from the p rosec~ t ion .~  
No, Professor Zacharias suggests a different sequence of 
intervention. First, the prosecutor might deliver some comradely 
admonitions to the defense lawyer, telling him to pull up his socks and 
do better for his client, or else withdraw. If that is not efficacious- 
and, in all honesty, it's hard to envision a really bad defense lawyer's 
radical improvement from such a conversation, nor a trial judge's 
happily acceding to that lawyer's motion to withdraw because the 
prosecutor says "The defense lawyer's not doing a good enough job 
for the defendantvp3-then the prosecutor must try to force the issue 
8 2  Id at 71. I actually find this projected trajectory of "moral hazard" rather far- 
fetched. Unless the prosecutor or the defense lawyer shov;s up in the case only at the 
start of trial, with no prior contact with the adversary, it would be surprising if such 
gross defects in the defendant's representation went undetected throughout prior 
proceedings-proceedings that would most likely culminate in a plea, not a trial. The 
prosecutor, therefore, would in reality have reason to know the trial would not be 
adequately adversarial much earlier on. 
Moreover, in my judgment, it would take a long, long, long time before most 
defense counsel clever enough to anticipate and try to fake advantage of a 
prosecutor's feeling compelled to offer evidence favorable to the defense in rebuttal 
would bank on it. Erratic as the quality of representation for the indigent defendant 
is, I doubt there are enough bad defense lawyers out there, and I'm sure there are not 
enough prosecutors who see rectifying their errors as an aspect of the mission "to do 
justice", for one of each to coincide on the already statistically rare event of a trial. 
Also, this scenario would have to recur very, very frequently before any semi- 
competent defense attorney would hold back on viable arguments or evidence just to 
trap the prosecutor into offering them. 
83. The reported opinions on ineffective assistance are replete with examples of 
lawyers pleading with trial judges, fruitlessly, to be relieved from criminal defense 
appointments because the l ayers  knew that they \\.ere or ~vould be in stark violation 
of DR 6-101(A)(1). See N.Y. Code, supra note 13. DR 6-101(A)(l) ("A lalayer shall 
not: handle a legal matter which he knows or should know that he is not competent to 
handle."); see also Model Rules of Prof1 Conduct R 1.1 (1983) [hereinafter Model 
Rules] ("A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent 
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation 
reasonably necessary for the representation."). See, eg.. Aldrich v. Wain\bnght, 777 
F.2d 630, 633 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that continuance \pill not be granted even 
though counsel stated that he was "totally unprepared" and not in a position to 
provide competent legal representation; as a result, defendant convicted and 
sentenced to death); Dillon v. Duckworth. 751 F.2d 895. 897 (7th Cir. 1984) 
(upholding conviction and death sentence of defendant despite trial court's denial of 
defense lawyer's request for continuance of murder trial because of his inability to 
prepare due to three major life crises-his father's h e m  surgery, his brother's 
paralysis, and hi own divorce-in the preceding three months; counsel had been 
ordered to proceed even though he had spent less than four hours d t h  defendant); 
United States v. Ruiz, 533 F.2d 939, 939-40 (5th Cir. 1976) (refusing to grant 
continuance or withdrawal even though counsel had been arrested on an extradition 
warrant during trial, and had requested continuance after release because he was in 
"emotional shambles7' and could not proceed); United States v. Ploeger, 428 F.2d 
1204, 1205 (6th Ci. 1970) (upholding conviction and twenty-pear sentence of 
defendant after one-day trial, although lawyer had been ordered to trial on his first 
day of appearance in the case, and had told the judge that he had never seen the 
indictment, investigated, nor prepared the case); Wood v. Superior Court, 690 P.2d 
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on the trial judge, either by "simply.. . telling the judge" or with a 
formal motion to disqual~fy.~~ 
And then what? Professor Zacharias anticipates that the "practice 
of reporting inadequate performance would have beneficial effects for 
defendants" by both alerting the defendant to his counsel's failings 
and enabling the trial judge to remedy the otherwise "hidden 
1225 (1984), overruled in part on other grounds, DeLisio v. Alaska Superior Court, 
740 P.2d 437 (Alaska 1987); see akio Stem v. County Court, 773 P.2d 1074,1080 (Colo. 
1989) (holding that an attorney appointed to represent a criminal defendant who 
believes that he or she is incompetent to handle the case bears the burden of proving 
that incompetence to the court); State v. Wilson, 687 P.2d 800,802-03 (Or. Ct. App. 
1984) (denying defense counsel's request to withdraw from the case, despite his 
contention that he could not adequately defend his client because he was intimidated 
by the trial judge); In re J. R. C., 593 S.W.2d 124,124-25 (Tex. App. 1979) (finding 
that lower court properly denied counsel's request to withdraw due to his lack of 
experience and familiarity with criminal trials); cf: Easley v. State, 334 So. 2d 630,632 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (granting on reconsideration an initial denial of motion to 
withdraw in felony case, but holding lawyer in contempt and fining him $500 for 
informing defendant that he felt incompetent to provide representation); see generally 
Annotation, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Right of Attorney to Withdraw, as 
Appointed Defense Counsel, Due to SelfAvowed Incompetence, 16 A.L.R.5th 118 
(1993 & Supp. 2000). 
There is no indication in any of these cases that the prosecutor opposed the 
appointed counsel's application to withdraw, but these judges nonetheless insisted 
that counsel proceed. Apparently, it is a "widely-held concern" of the bench that 
some defense lawyers are so zealous and self-sacrificing that they will feign 
"ineffectiveness" as part of a deliberate stratagem to "throw" the case in order to 
create an ineffectiveness issue on appeal. See People v. Sullivan, 550 N.Y.S.2d 358, 
361 (App. Div. 1990) (holding lawyer's misconduct in disparaging murder victims 
during summation "in terms which any decent person would find offensiven- 
suggesting that they were "unsavory moral degenerates who . . . deserved to diev- 
must have been a trial tactic, albeit "desperate" and "reckless;" even if this tactic were 
undertaken without defendant's knowledge or consent, still not ineffective 
assistance). To me, it seems a bit far-fetched to fear that lawyers would happily 
proclaim themselves incompetent in order to infect the record with reversible error 
and assist obviously guilty defendants who are paying them nothing. 
Nor is the refusal to relieve lawyers who confess incompetence a problem confined 
to individual court-appointed counsel. With equal lack of success, institutional and 
public defenders have tried to seek relief from further appointments by asserting that 
wildly excessive caseloads, insufficient training and resources, etc., make them unable 
to offer representation that constitutes "preparation adequate in the circumstances." 
See N.Y. Code, supra note 13, DR 6-101(A)(2)-(3); see also Model Rules, supra R. 
1.1,1.3 ("thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation"; 
"reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client"). See Klein, The 
Relationship of the Court and Defense Counsel, supra note 11, at 540-48; Rebecca 
Marcus, Note, Racism in Our Courts: The Underfunding of Public Defenders and Its 
Disproportionate Impact Upon Racial Minorities, 22 Hastings Const. L.Q. 219,230-37 
(1994). 
Ironically, lawyers who seek relief from court appointment to represent the 
indigent on civil matters enjoy an absolute right to withdraw for any reason or no 
reason. See Mallard v. United States Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296 
(1989). They can even mandamus the judge! A heady thought for any erstwhile 
criminal defense lawyer. Id. at 309,316. 
84. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics, supra note 18, at 72. 
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ineffectiveness" by replacing or supplementing the failing l a ~ y e r . ~  At 
a minimum, the trial judge would have to conduct a hearing on the 
issue, which should provide a far fuller record on ap eal than is 
typically available to the ineffectively-assisted appellant. EX! 
At this point, I have to try to translate this seductive scenario back 
to 100 Centre Street. What is the probable reaction of the defense 
lawyer? Most of the terrible defense lawyers, whether from Legal 
Aid, a contract defender, or 18-B, are there because it's the best 
option they have-in that sense, because they choose to be. The 
lawyers still working at 100 Centre Street are largely divided behveen 
1) the conscientious and dedicated who feel compelled to try to meet 
the desperate need for competent representation, and 2) the dregs 
who can't drum up enough private business or find another salaried 
job. In other jurisdictions and settings, lawyers may be dragooned 
into criminal court and assigned cases, but in New York City, that is 
exceedingly rare. So, there is little reason to anticipate the bad 
defense lawyer's seizing on the prosecutor's allegations of 
incompetence as a way out of a case. 
On the contrary, wouldn't we expect their intense resistance to 
being labeled as not just less-than-topnotch, but as so patently, 
grotesquely incompetent as to fall below the low, low threshold for 
effective assistance, or at least, in Professor Zacharias' phrase, "lax 
oppo~ition"?~~ Even if the lawyer wanted off the case for any of a 
number of reasons, such as distaste for the defendant or the crime, 
once the issue is framed as representation so poor as to be 
unconstitutional, what defense lawyer will meekly concede? While 
assuredly quality control among the institutional defenders is not all 
that it should be, removal from even one case on this basis could spark 
some inquiry, and if repeated, eventually might lead to the offender's 
loss of employment or panel membership. That, of course, is exactly 
what we would hope for, but the defense lawyer is not likely to go 
quietly. 
Perhaps, as Professor Zacharias suggests, through a fact-finding 
hearing or in-court colloquy, the defendant will learn of the 
prosecutor's concern.88 If so, what will the defendant make of it? If 
85. Id at 73. Yet doesn't this reliance on the court seem misplaced in Light of 
Professor Zacharias' analysis, a few pages before, of the limited options in the way of 
substitute counsel available to the court? See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying 
text. Again, even when defense counsel proclaim their incompetence to a court, 
judges not merely allow but force them to continue representation in stark violation 
of the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights. See supra note 83. So why assume that 
making the judge aware of counsel's deficiencies will accomplish much? 
86. Id at 73-74. 
87. Id at 74. 
88. Or then again, perhaps not. See Bellamy v. Cogdell, 952 F2d 626,628-29 (2d 
Cir. 1991) (discussing trial judge's failure to advise the defendant prior to trial of 
pending disciplinary charges against his attorney or attorney's admitted incapacity). 
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the defendant already has misgivings about the zeal or skill of counsel, 
will those misgivings be confirmed or confused by the arch-enemy's 
red flag? If, as seems all too likely based on the cool reception judges 
accord post-conviction and appellate claims of ineffective assistance, 
counsel is not replaced, what will have been accomplished? Will this 
airing of the situation make the defense lawyer shape up and fly right? 
Will it allay or exacerbate the defendant's concerns? If the judge 
ultimately replaces counsel, and Gust for argument's sake) the new 
lawyer determines that the defendant would be best served by trying 
to work out the best deal possible, will the defendant wonder whether 
this was all a clever ruse to obtain a guilty plea? 
Do we really have reason to believe that even if the original defense 
counsel is replaced, it will be by a more talented or dedicated or 
knowledgeable defender? It's impossible to give odds, but we do 
know that more and more of that type of lawyer are leaving this 
practice, in part because of the lack of compen~ation.~~ 
According to these analyses, we certainly had a substantial basis to 
conclude that if we were convinced that the quality of Mr. Defender's 
representation fell below the standard of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, we ought to intervene. But what if we concluded that Mr. 
Defender was merely "incompetent", in terms of the CodeIRules 
requirement of competence, but not "ineffective" as Sixth 
Amendment jurisprudence has defined that term? Did we have a 
responsibility to act even if Mr. Defender's representation managed to 
pass constitutional muster? 
- 
All of the authorities that had addressed the issue seem to suggest 
that prosecutorial intervention is not required absent a constitutional 
violation, although it might well be warranted. The judicial decisions 
on ineffective assistance of counsel indicate that Mr. Defender's 
conduct, damaging as it had been, technically did not rise (or sink?) to 
the standard of a constitutional violation. After all, Mr. Cliente had 
told us himself that he was guilty, with the warm body of his licensed 
lawyer standing by. The Sixth Amendment, according to the Supreme 
Court and the Second Circuit, had been satisfied because no matter 
what happened to Mr. Cliente, it could hardly be an "unjust" 
o u t ~ o m e . ~  Nor would New York State's standard for the right to 
counsel- "meaningful representation" -require much more.91 
89. See supra note 66; see also Def.'s Supplemental Mem., supra note 66. 
90. Strickland's required showing of a "reasonable probability that, absent the 
errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt" is virtually 
impossible to establish when the defendant is factually guilty. The Supreme Court 
said that only the defendant who can show that otherwise he may have been acquitted 
is entitled to a remedy for ineffective assistance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 695 (1984); see also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52,59 (1985) (finding that when 
defendant's lawyer misinformed defendant about length of minimum sentence prior 
to entry of negotiated plea for that sentence, the defendant must show a "reasonable 
probability" that he would have instead gone to trial and been acquitted); see also 
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We found ourselves still in the realm of discretion, so far as our 
duty to "justice" and the adversary system is concerned. 
B. Even if the Prosecutorial Duty to "Seek Justice" Does Not Require 
Intervention, Are Prosecutors Required by DR I-103(A) / M.R. 8.3 to 
Report Incompetent Defense Counsel? 
The issue that confronted us has, as noted above, rarely been 
characterized as a specific issue of prosecrttorial ethics. It can, 
however, be denominated a subset of a venerable, and amply codified, 
ethical mandate: the lawyer's duty to report a "violation of [any 
Disciplinary Rule] that raises a substantial question as to another 
lawyer's.. . fitness. . . to a tribunal or other authority empowered to 
investigate or act upon such [a] ~iolation."~ Prosecutors do not seem 
to be exempt from this ~bligation:~ and while for at least thirty years 
Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes, supra note 69. at 6 4 - 4 5  (arguing that 
inadequate counsel at trial prevents defendant from proving prejudice on appeal by 
failing to develop the record). 
91. People v. Benevento, 91 N.Y.2d 708.713 (1998) (interpreting N.Y. Const. art. 
I, $6); People v. Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 137,146-47 (1981). 
92. N.Y. Code, supra note 13, DR 1-103(A); see also Model Rules, nrpra note 8. 
R 8.3, which uses almost identical language. Note that thc Rule does not 
contemplate, but could be read to include, reporting misconduct to a judge presiding 
in a case, to an intra-organizational supervisor of an attorney in an institutional 
practice, or to a more general oversight body such as. in New York, the Indigent 
Defender Oversight Committee or the 18-B Panel Administrator. 
93. Prosecutors are generally subject to the same professional standards and 
regulations as any other attorneys. See Fred C. Zacharias. Specificity in Professional 
Responsibility Codes: Theory, Practice, and the Paradigtn of Prosec~~torial Etlrics, 69 
Notre Dame L. Rev. 223,248 n.82.249 n.83.269 (1993) (noting that prosecutors are 
subject to most professional requirements applicable to other la\vyers); see also Bruce 
A. Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors: Do Too hiany Regulators Produce Too Little 
Enforcement?, 8 St. Thomas L. Rev. 69, 73-74. 88-91 (1995) (noting that federal 
prosecutors are subject to state as well as federal disciplinary authority). 
For about a decade, federal prosecutors attempted to claim exemption from some 
or al l  state-promulgated ethical codes, in response to increasingly broad 
interpretations of the prohibition on contacting adverse represented parties (codified 
in N.Y. Code, supra note 13, DR 7-104(A)(l) and Model Rule 4.2). and particularly in 
reaction to the sanctions imposed by the Second Circuit on an Assistant U.S. 
Attorney for violating that rule by working with a represented undercover informant. 
See United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 838-40 (2d Cir. 1988). The ensuing 
controversy spawned a substantial literature. For an exhaustive step-by-step account, 
see the Winter 1992 Symposium issue of the Pittsburgh Law Review, especially John 
M. Burkoff, Prosecutorial Ethics: The Duty Not "To Strike Foul Blolrts", 53 U. Pitt. L. 
Rev. 271, 271-76 (1992); Roger C. Cramton & Lisa K. Udell. State Etl~ics Rules and 
Federal Prosec~ors: The Controversies Over the Anti-Contact and S~rbpoena Rules, 53 
U .  Pitt. L. Rev. 291, 318-24 (1992). While with the recent passage of the McDade 
Amendment, Congress has unequivocally expressed its position that fedenl 
prosecutors are and shall be subject to state and lo& fedcnl ethics codes, one still 
cannot say whether any or all courts will accept that directive and exercise their 
inherent powers if called upon to impose discipline. See Citizens Protection Act of 
1998,28 U.S.C. § 530B @Vest Supp. 2000). 
At least one state disciplinary body has issued an opinion specifically instructing 
prosecutors to report to disciplinary authorities an apparent conflict of interest on the 
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commentators have decried its ineffi~acy~~, since the unexpected and 
supposedly unprecedented 1989 decision of the Illinois Supreme 
Court in In re Himrnel,gs it has assumed far greater salience. Limited 
as the enforcement of this Rule has been in the past, the possibility of 
future enforcement certainly garners attention. 
While at first blush, this Disciplinary Rule seemed close to a clear 
command in this case, we quickly came up with a number of reasons it 
might not be applicable. First, if Mr. Defender's incompetence didn't 
quahfy as ineffective assistance, could it still violate Canon 61 Second, 
was this "duty to report" really intended to apply in the context of 
part of opposing counsel, i.e. the fact that a criminal defense attorney belongs to the 
same firm as the prosecutor in that jurisdiction. The opinion in no way grapples with 
the potential nuances of conflict of interest rules, and finds no special basis for the 
posited duty in the prosecutorial role, viewing prosecutors as just another species of 
lawyer mandated to report unprivileged knowledge of code violations. Bd. of 
Comm'rs on Grievances and Discipline, Ohio Adv. Op. 89-09,1989 WL 535014 (Ohio 
Apr. 14,1989). 
94. In Wolfram's succinct phrase "Probably no other professional requirement is 
as widely ignored by lawyers subject to it." Wolfram, supra note 17, at 683. Wolfram 
quotes ABA Spec. Comm. On Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement, Problems and 
Recommendations in Disciplinary Enforcement (Clark Report) 167 (1970): 
Although lawyers and judges have the necessary background to evaluate the 
conduct of attorneys and are far better equipped than laymen to recognize 
violation of professional standards, relatively few complaints are submitted 
to disciplinary agencies by members of the profession. This fact has been 
cited as a major problem by nearly every disciplinary agency in the United 
States surveyed by this Committee. 
Id. at n.18; see ako David R. Ramage-White, Note, The Lawyer's Duty to Report 
Professional Misconduct, 20 Ariz. L. Rev. 509, 512, 530 &passim (1978) (concluding 
that majority of lawyers ignore DR 1-103(A) and fail to report unethical conduct; 
after having surveyed the Arizona bar to determine the willingness of lawyers to 
report misconduct and finding that "most Arizona lawyers would report, if at all, only 
the most serious infractions of the legal profession's ethical standards"); Ronald D. 
Rotunda, The Lawyer's Duty to Report Another Lawyer's Unethical Violations in the 
Wake of Hirnrnel, 1988 U .  Ill. L. Rev. 977,982 (stating that it is "virtually unheard" of 
to find bar authorities enforcing this rule); John G. Bonomi, Do Lawyers Have 
Ethical Duty to Inform on Other Lawyers?, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 8,1978, at 3 (former long- 
time bar counsel confessing that he is unaware of any instance in the history of New 
York of imposition of discipline for failure to report misconduct of another attorney; 
and observing that he was, at the time, the sole disciplinary counsel in New York ever 
to have tried to prosecute such a charge; even though the respondent in that case 
admitted to witnessing and not reporting bribery and obstruction of justice by another 
lawyer, he was acquitted). 
95. 533 N.E.2d 790 (Ill. 1988) (upholding one-year suspension for failing to report 
another lawyer's conversion of client funds, in order to obtain restitution of funds for 
the cheated client). The decision and the stunned reaction to it are thoroughly 
described in Michael J. Bunvick, Note, You Dirty Rat!! Model Rule 8.3 and 
Mandatory Reporting of Attorney Misconduct, 8 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 137 (1994). I 
call the decision "supposedly" unprecedented because, in fact, other notable 
decisions, albeit only a handful, had previously disciplined attorneys for failing to 
report misconduct. See, e.g., In re Dowd, 559 N.Y.S.2d 365,366 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990). 
Himmel, however, is viewed as significant because it is the first instance of reported 
discipline based solely on the lawyer's failure to report another lawyer's misconduct. 
See Rotunda, supra note 94, at 982. 
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actively opposed litigators? Third, did we "know" enough to make a 
judgment about Mr. Defender's competence? Fourth, should we take 
any steps that might be considered to constitute disparagement of Mr. 
Defender to his client? 
1. Does Mere Bad Lawyering by a Criminal Defense Attorney 
Violate the Disciplinary Rules? 
Is the unzealous, nonresponsive, confidence-revealing criminal 
defender violating an ethical duty, and, more to the point in this 
context, the Disciplinary Rule? The plain language of Canon 6,  "A 
Lawyer Should Represent a Client Competently," is amplified by DR 
6-101, which states, "A lawyer shall not. . . [hlandle a legal matter 
without preparation adequate in the circumstances [nor] [nleglect a 
legal matter entrusted to the lawyer," and by the gloss of EC 6 4  
"The lawyer's obligation to the client requires adequate preparation 
for and appropriate attention to the legal work, as well as promptly 
responding to inquiries from the client."% The parallel provisions 
from the Model Rules of Professional Conduct require lawyers to 
offer their clients legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, reasonably 
necessary preparation, diligence, and sufficient explanation of legal 
matters to enable the client to make informed  decision^.^ 
True, the rare bench that overturns a conviction for ineffective 
assistance of counsel-which intuitively would seem a per se breach of 
Canon 6, etc.-virtually never reports the offending lawyer,% and the 
96. I am not even considering the alternative ground of violation under DR 6- 
101(A)(1), which states, "A lawyer shall not: [hlandle a legal matter which the lav,yer 
knows or should know that he or she is not competent to handle, without associating 
with a lawyer who is competent to handle it." See also Model Rules, supra note 83, R 
1.1. Were that the only basis of ethical responsibility for bad lawyers. it would be easy 
enough to escape on the ground that we cannot howv whether the lawvyer is 
competent, in some essential sense; we can only observe whether the lawyer appears 
to be, in the more existential language of DR 6-101(A)(2), "Failing to Act 
Competently" on this particular occasion. N.Y. Code, supra note 13, DR 6-101. 
97. Model Rules, supra note 83, R. 1.1 (Competence), 1 3  (Diligence), and 1.4 
(Communication). 
98. Courts refuse to equate the hvo standards. Because of the additional 
requirement of demonstrating "prejudice" to sustain an ineffective assistance claim, it 
is possible for a lawyer to be disciplined for incompetence, but for the incompetently 
represented defendant's conviction to stand. See In re Wolfnm. 847 P2d. 94. 98 
(Ariz 1993); In re Agrillo, 604 N.Y.S.2d 171.173 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993). If we were 
to take guidance from the jurisprudence of ineffective assistance as to what 
constitutes Canon 6 incompetence, we would h o w  that it is not, for example, a 
complete lack of trial or criminal practice experience, see United States v. Cronic, 466 
U.S. 648, 663-67 (1984) (sustaining conviction for felony mail fraud when appointed 
counsel, a young real estate lawyer, had only hventy-five days to prepare a case 
involving mountains of documents); use of narcotics during trial. see People v. Badia, 
552 N.Y.S.2d 439, 440 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (upholding twenty-to-life sentence of 
defendant whose trial counsel, one month after trial, was indicted for and ultimately 
convicted of obstruction of justice and conspiracy to distribute drugs. and wvas proven 
to have been addicted to narcotics during trial); or, that perennial favorite, sleeping 
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number of cases of discipline of any attorney, let alone a criminal 
defense attorney, for violations of DR 6-101 and its equivalents is 
vanishingly We found no reported cases or ethics opinions or 
other commentary describing imposition of professional discipline on 
a criminal defender for inducing a client's confession to the authorities 
without (as seemed safe to surmise in our case) having properly 
advised the client of the potential risks. Nonetheless, Canon 6 and 
Model Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4 are unassailably applicable to the criminal 
lawyer. Mr. Defender's conduct would seem to nail just about every 
one of these grounds for discipline, even if it did not constitute 
ineffective assistance. 
2. Does the "Duty to Report" Encompass Adversary Misconduct? 
Given the potential of the adversary system to inspire vindictiveness 
and manipulation, it would not be surprising if courts, disciplinary 
tribunals, or professional rule-makers excepted lawyers in adversarial 
positions from a duty to report on one another. The purpose would 
be to eliminate the temptation to use a report of misconduct to 
distract an opponent or render the adverse party insecure about the 
quality of his advocate. Professor Green discussed this possibility, 
noting that "[a]ccusations of unethical conduct in the course of 
criminal proceedings, however, present the risk that false accusations 
during trial, even when combined with illegal solicitation of an extra $5000 fee despite 
prohibition on court-appointed counsel's seeking additional compensation for 
representation of indigent, see People v. Tippins, 570 N.Y.S.2d 581,582-83 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1991) (holding that lawyer's sleeping during trial, although "reprehensible," was 
not sufficient to establish per se violation of constitutional right to counsel, even when 
combined with lawyer's subsequent criminal convictions for fraudulent and unethical 
fee solicitation), cert. denied sub norn. Tippins v. New York, 502 U.S. 1064 (1992), 
rev'd sub norn. Tippins v. Walker, 77 F.3d 682 (2d Cir. 1996). See also the recent 
reaffirmation that a lawyer who slept through substantial portions of prosecution 
witness testimony in a capital murder trial nonetheless rendered constitutionally 
adequate assistance under the Strickland standard, Burdine v. Johnson, 2000 WL 
1610328 (5th Cir. 2000). 
99. See Wolfram, supra note 17, at 190, 811 ("To date, the enforcement of 
competence standards has been generally limited to relatively exotic, blatant, or 
repeated cases of lawyer bungling. . . . It is even rarer to find a disciplinary proceeding 
brought against a defense lawyer for incompetent representation."); Susan R. Martyn, 
Lawyer Competence and Lawyer Discipline: Beyond the Bar? 69 Geo. L.J. 705,718 
(1981). Of the relatively few cases in which lawyers have been prosecuted for neglect 
or incompetence, the emphasis is definitely on the civil side; criminal defendants, 
especially indigent defendants, are far less likely to file a complaint with the 
authorities. (That's also why indigent defense organizations have comparatively low 
malpractice insurance premiums.) For example, of the 100 or so cases cited in the 
annotations to Model Rules 1.1 and 1.3 in the ABA Center for Professional 
Responsibility's Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 3-9,26-30 (4th ed. 
1999), only sixteen of these textbook examples of incompetence of counsel involved 
criminal proceedings. 
Heinonline - -  69 Fordham L. Rev. 1 0 3 4  2 0 0 0 - 2 0 0 1  
will undermine the relationship between defense counsel and the 
defendant."loO 
As a policy matter, exempting adversaries from the general duty of 
mandatory reporting seems to make sense. The lost benefit, i.e. valid 
reports about adversaries, would seem minimal, since opposing 
counsel more rarely display their warts to one another than they do to 
colleagues or co-counsel. The trade-off is reducing the risk of 
frivolous or mischievous reports that are the product of retaliation, or 
just the jaundiced perspective of an adversary. Lawyers who did 
report another lawyer's misconduct in a non-adversarial setting might 
be more confident that because of the exception, their reports would 
receive greater credence. It might seem less likely that the first 
question on the report recipient's mind would be, "What grudge does 
Reporting Lawyer have against Reported Lawyer?" 
Another reason to exempt adversaries from mandatory reporting 
would be to prevent neat orchestration of disqualification of the 
opposing party's chosen attorney. It is problematic enough, especially 
for a prosecutor, to make a motion to disqualify opposing c0unse1.l~~ 
Universally, it is suspected that the motive is not to protect the 
opposing party from the diluted loyalty of a lawyer who should be 
"conflicted" out of the case, and certainly not from that lawyer's 
inadequate effort or skill. It is assumed that disqualification motions 
are made for tactical advantage, and they often are viewed with 
disfavor for that reason. Ethics committees reviewing instances in 
100. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, nrpra note 8. at 624 1.1.76. 
The usual deterrent of potential defamation liability for a false or fallacious report 
may be absent, since there is at least some authority that would immunize all reports 
of professional misconduct. See San Diego County B. M n  Legal Ethics and 
Unlawful Practice Comm., Formal Op. 1992-2 (1992); The ABAIBNA Lawyer's 
Manual on Professional Conduct, Ethics Opinions 1991-1995, § 1001:1801 (1999): 
(illustrating that even in California, one of the three states without a mandatory duty 
to report in its ethical code, lawvyer who does report another lawyer's misconduct is 
absolutely privileged); see also Weber v. Cueto, 568 N.E.2d 513.517-20 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1991) (granting absolute privilege for allegations that lawyer had misused public 
funds). 
101. In recent years, a major ethics topic in prosecutorial circles has been the 
allegedly abusive use by prosecutors of motions to disqualify. See Bruce A. Green, 
"Through a Glass, Darkly": Hoiv tire Courts See Alotions to Disqiialifj, Criminal 
Defense Lawyers, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1201 (1989); see also Rodriguez v. State, 628 P2d 
950, 953 (Ariz. 1981) (holding that prosecutor lacked standing to move for 
disqualification of defense lawyer because of apparent conflict and stating in dicta, "If 
the State believed an ethical violation was occurring. it should have followed the 
guidelines of the Code of Professional Responsibility." Id. (quoting equivalent Code 
section of N.Y. Code, supra note 13, DR 1-103(A)). The court observed that 
"once.. . indigency is determined the county attorney has no standing to object as to 
who will or will not represent the defendant.. . . Not only does this strike at the very 
heart of the adversary system, but.. . for the prosecution to participate in the 
selection or rejection of its opposing counsel is unseemly if for no other reason than 
the distasteful impression which could be conveyed." Id. (quoting Knapp v. Hardy. 
523 P.2d 1308,1311 (Ariz. 1974)). 
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which lawyers want to report or have reported adversaries during the 
pendency of litigation have viewed these complaints with suspicion, 
and denounced any hint that the reporter might be seeking to force 
settlement or merely throw the opposing lawyer and party off stride.lm 
Here, if we were to report Mr. Defender to disciplinary authorities for 
a violation of Canon 6, it was possible that not only he, but we, would 
end up off the case-him because of his "personal interest" in 
vindication in the disciplinary process, us, because of our potential 
role as witnesses in a disciplinary proceeding.lo3 Mr. Cliente might get 
a better defense lawyer, and he might be prosecuted by an ADA less 
engaged with domestic violence issues, and with less time to devote to 
the case. Would that be "justice" for Josetta? 
3. Did We "Know" That Mr. Defender was Incompetent?: 
The Scienter Element of the Duty to Report 
Another technical way out of the prosecutor's dilemma would be to 
follow the lead of some of the case law and commentary that demands 
a level of "knowledge" for purposes of the duty to report that no 
prosecutor would have to prove in order to establish scienter 
sufficient for a criminal conviction.lol My favorite example of judicial 
envelope-pushing in this regard is the lengthy decision of the 
Mississippi Supreme Court in Attorney U v. The Mississippi Bar.lo5 A 
case of first impression for that court-it noted that its research 
revealed only three cases nationwide on the subject of the duty to 
report- the court reviewed all the bar association ethics opinions and 
other authorities it could find, including quoting at length from the 
102 See ABA Comrn. on Ethics and Prof1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-383 
(1994) (stating that lawyers must not file or threaten to file report with disciplinary 
tribunal as a tactical ploy in litigation); accord N.Y. State B. Ass'n Comm. on Profl 
Ethics, Op. 635 (1992); see also Pa. State B. Comm. on Legal Ethics and Profl 
Responsibility, Informal Op. 97-40 (1997) (concluding that a lawyer who believes that 
opposing counsel, representing two parties, should be conflicted out, despite consent 
of both parties, has duty to report the conflict only if lawyer has firm basis to conclude 
that the dual representation will harm one or both of the opposing parties); The 
ABAIBNA Lawyer's Manual on Professional Conduct, 5 101:207 (1999) (discussing 
the possibility that lawyer can bootstrap disciplinary complaint against adversary 
counsel into basis for disqualification). See also United States v. Jones, 900 F.2d 512, 
518-20 (2d Cir. 1990) (rejecting defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
based on prosecutor's threat during trial to file a disciplinary complaint against 
defense counsel; on appeal, defendant alleged that defense counsel could not "make 
disinterested, objective tactical decisions or give . . . disinterested, objective advice" 
because of his concern about prosecutor's threat, which court dismissed as 
"hysterics"; in dictum, court indicated that claim of ineffective assistance could be 
sustained if threat of disciplinary action from prosecutor had "any basis in fact or 
law," because defense counsel might fear to engage in vigorous advocacy on behalf of 
defendant). 
103. See N.Y. Code, supra note 13, DR 5-101,5-102. 
104. See id. DR 1-103; Model Rules, supra note 83, R. 8.3. 
105. 678 So. 2d 963 (Miss. 1996). 
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excellent treatment of this particular dimension of the duty to report 
by Geoffrey Hazard and William Hodes. As they cogently observe: 
In terms of what can be proved, the "knows" standard thus begins to 
merge with the "should have known" standard, for often it will be 
impossible to believe that a lawyer lacked knowledge unless he 
deliberately tried to evade it. But one who knows enough to evade 
legally significant knowledge already knows too much. 
. . .[T]here comes a point where only brute rationalization, moral 
irresponsibility, and pure sophistry can support the contention that 
the lawyer does not "know" what the situation is.'@ 
If ever one would think that point had been reached, it would seem 
that Attorney U did in this case.lo7 However, while adopting an 
objective "reasonable lawyer" standard for deciding whether the 
respondent "had such knowledge as would enable him to testify as a 
witness" that another lawvyer had violated a disciplinary rule, the 
Mississippi Supreme Court determined that the "unsworn description 
of a client7' of the reported lawyer's misconduct did not constitute the 
requisite "clear and convincing evidence," such that "any reasonable 
lawyer would have formed a firm opinion that the conduct alleged by 
106. Id at 971 (quoting Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The h w  of 
Lawyering, $0 402,403 (1993)). 
107. Attorney U had been approached by the proprietor of a for-profit medical lab 
whose sole function was to perform pulmonary function tests on claimants who were 
seeking compensation or damages from asbestos manufacturers. Id. at 976 n2. The 
lab-which seems to have been a rather unsavory set-up to begin with, since the 
proprietor had been a business agent for "a large union" (one could sunnise, a union 
whose members comprised asbestos exposure victims)-entered into a thoroughly 
unethical fee-splitting arrangement whereby a plaintiffs' attorney referred his clients 
to the lab for "free" testing in exchange for promising the lab half of all legal fees 
eventually realized from the cases, plus some reimbursement of the medial costs, on 
a contingency basis. Id at 976 & n.2. 
After a falling-out between the lawyer and the lab, the attorney hired another 
lawyer to represent him in negotiating with the lab, and explicitly took refuge in the 
unethical nature of the agreement. The lab retained Attorney U, who first tried to 
negotiate a flat, rather than contingent, fee for each patientlclient tested that was 
almost ten times the going rate for equivalent testing elsewhere. Id. at 966. When that 
was rejected by the plainti£fs' attorney, Attorney U warned him that Attorney U had 
advised his client, the lab, that it could file a grievance with the bar association- 
which, ultimately, it did. Id 
Subsequently, the plaintiffs' attorney filed a complaint against Attorney U, in part 
charging him with threatening to file a bar complaint in order to extort a settlement 
for his client. Id at 967. The Mississippi Bar Association found no probable cause to 
sustain that complaint. Instead, it filed its own formal complaint against Attorney U 
on the sole ground of failure to report the fee-splitting conduct of the plaintiffs' 
attorney. Id Attorney U's response was that he did not have "personal knowledge" 
that the plaintiffs attorney had violated any disciplinary rule. but h e w  only that the 
attorney had denied what Attorney U's client, the lab, had told him about the fee- 
splitting. Id at 968-69. 
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[the] client had in fact occurred."108 Therefore, the Court refused to 
sustain the complaint against Attorney U.lo9 
In a vehement dissent, Justice McRae called the majority's inability 
to find scienter under these circumstances "incredible," and suggested 
that the majority ought, "[rlather than insulting our intelligence. . . 
simply repeal a rule it so obviously dislikes," or "[bletter yet, why not 
discard the Rules of Professional Conduct altogether?"l1° The 
majority, he concluded, was paying "lip service" to the rules so that it 
could allow the respondent, "a partner in a distinguished Jackson law 
firm whose members include a former president of the Bar 
Association, to walk away without so much as a slap on the hand.""' 
Other less entertaining but more enlightening authority on this 
point includes the thorough report of the Committee on Professional 
Responsibility of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York 
(the "C~mmittee")."~ The Committee emphasizes that "reporting 
alleged misconduct of another attorney is a serious charge" and warns 
that "[tlhe damage done by reporting allegations as to which there is a 
substantial doubt of truth will, in almost all situations, outweigh the 
damage done by failing to report."l13 Therefore, it adopts the 
standard set forth in EC 1-4: a lawyer must "believe clearly" that a 
violation of the Disciplinary Rules has occurred.114 
In this case, our belief was crystal. We did not hear about Mr. 
Defender's conduct from a third party; we witnessed it. Moreover, 
108. Id. at 972. 
109. Id. at 973. 
110. Id. at 975 (McRae, J., dissenting). 
111. Id. 
112. Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Comm. on Prof1 Responsibility, Report: 
The Artorney's Duties to Report the Misconduct of Other Attorneys and to Report 
Fraud on a Tribunal, 47 The Record 905 (1992) [hereinafter Ass'n of the Bar of the 
City of N.Y., Attorney's Duties]; see also D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 246 
(1994). The D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Committee found that fairly blatant negligence, 
i.e., failing to meet a statutory limitations period for filing suit, does not necessarily 
raise "a substantial question as to [the] lawyer's. . . fitness" and thereby trigger the 
duty to report. Id. (quoting Model Rule 8.3(a)). The Committee was reluctant to find 
that a single allegation of malpractice was tantamount to the lack of competence 
prohibited by Canon 6 or Model Rule 1.1. Id. The D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Committee 
was somewhat wishy-washy, however, leaving open the possibility that if it were clear 
to the inquiring lawyer that the malpracticing lawyer's conduct was willful or 
inexcusable, or if the facts of the particular case pointed to unfitness to practice law, 
the inquiring lawyer could "apply his own judgment" and decide whether a report was 
mandated. Id. See also Nassau County Bar Ass'n, Op. 98-12 (1998) (insisting that 
when inquiring lawyer learned opposing counsel had served as employment reference 
for client at the same time lawyer was making representations to tribunal that client 
was too disabled to work or pay child support, lawyer must determine for himself 
whether his "knowledge" of fraud on the court is sufficiently "actual" to require 
reporting). 
113. Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Attorney's Duties, supra note 112, at 909- 
10. 
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our initial impression of Mr. Defender had only been reinforced by 
the reports garnered from other ADAs. 
4. Is it Improper for Prosecutors to Comment to Defendants About 
the Qualifications andor Quality of Representation of Opposing 
Counsel? 
According to the American Bar Association Standards for Criminal 
Justice: Prosecution Function, Standard 3-1.3: Conflict of Interest 
(h): "A prosecutor should not. . . comment upon the reputation or 
abilities of defense counsel to an accused person . . . unless requested 
by such pers~n.""~ The Commentary goes on to acknowledge that a 
"prosecutor may possess a natural and understandable interest both in 
who is representing an accused person . . . and in how vigorously that 
individual is being represented. . . . [P]rosecutors are often uniquely 
well situated to assess the quality of the defense bar and defense 
representation in their  jurisdiction^.""^ However, "in the interests of 
the overall integrity of the criminal justice system, prosecutors should 
exercise great restraint when othenvise tempted to comment upon the 
reputation or abilities of particular defense counsel to an individual 
seeking defense representation. . . unless the issue has been directly 
raised in the first instance by th[at] individual . . . .""' 
Plainly when they advise "great restraint," the authors of the 
Standard and the Commentary were not contemplating a prosecutor 
concerned about ineffective assistance of counsel. The envisioned 
conflict was between the interest of the accused in representation that 
would lead to exculpation, and the prosecutor's interest in the 
"justice" that generally consists of a conviction; in that context* the 
prosecutor should hesitate to opine to the defendant on the quality of 
a defense attorney. The Standard is redolent of the hesitation almost 
any lawyer feels about "bad-mouthing" an opponent to that 
opponent's client. It has little to do with fraternal protectiveness; 
lawyers generally do not exhibit the sort of united front of solidarity 
that, whether accurately or not, is attributed to police officers or 
medical doctors. There is just something unseemly and unsporting 
115. ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution Function and Defense 
Function Standard 3-1.3(h) (1993). See also National District Attornejs' Association 
Prosecution Standards, supra note 17, § 25.6 ("When a prosecutor has knowledge of 
misconduct by defense counsel, the prosecutor has the responsibility to report that 
knowledge to the appropriate authority. . . ," and Commentary: -. . . If the prosecutor 
has a substantial basis for believing that misconduct [of defense counsel] exists, he 
should in all cases report that information to the appropriate authorities, at the same 
time being careful not to take action that would prejudice a defendant's right to a fair 
trial or precipitate a mistrial of the case. The timing of such report, therefore, may be 
an important element in a balanced approach to carrying out this responsibility."). 
116. ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution Function and Defense 
Function Standard 3-1.3 cmt. 
117. Id 
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about detailing the flaws and foibles of your past or current adversary 
to a civilian. 
And how, in practical terms, would we have managed to provide 
this information to Mr. Cliente? Even if we were trying to carry out 
our ethical duty, that would not necessarily excuse our contacting the 
defendant directly rather than through c o ~ n s e l ~ ~ ~ - a t  leas , we could 
find no authority to suggest that it would. If we somehow rationalized 
that we could do so, what would we say? It would be an extremely 
delicate communication, difficult to craft and orchestrate. We would 
have to communicate with the defense counsel as well, if not 
simultaneously. To plan and manage all of this would be a major 
distraction from the important work that we knew was part of our 
role. We had all that we could do, in terms of energy and tasks, to 
maintain our relationship with Mr. Cliente's distraught wife, Josetta. 
We had both statutory119 and professional obligations to keep our 
complainant informed, to help her with safety planning (now that we 
knew about Mr. Cliente's contacts, we would provide her with a 
cellphone that dials only 911), to make referrals for culturally 
competent counseling and immigration status advice and legal 
assistance in Family Court, and housing and medical treatment for her 
and her two daughters-and this work was definitely our priority. 
No: we were not prepared to reach out to Mr. Cliente and spend 
hours trying to explain enough about the adversary system and the 
duties of defense counsel to get across that his lawyer had messed up. 
What would that accomplish? What remedy, at this point, would he 
have? If he could obtain a new lawyer, a defender with enough 
sophistication to work with him on changing his attitude and his 
behavior, on compliance with the Order of Protection, on paying child 
support, maybe, just possibly, he could avoid a conviction. High- 
quality defense counsel can make a tremendous difference in domestic 
violence cases, especially by helping defendants understand the terms 
and the significance of court orders-which can redound to the 
victim's benefit. But this scenario seemed so unlikely. I just did not 
believe that a New York City Criminal Court judge-inured to the 
healthy percentage of lawyers in that court who never show up on 
- - 
118. See supra note 35. Recently a prosecutor was disciplined for contacting a 
defendant without the knowledge of the defense counsel. Although his primary 
offense was engaging in secret plea negotiations with the defendant without counsel's 
knowledge or consent, the prosecutor also filed a false affidavit with the court about 
the secret meeting, and then denied its occurrence to the disciplinary panel 
investigating the matter for two years, until finally he broke down and admitted it. In  
re Brey, 490 N.W.2d 15, 16 (Wis. 1992). In this context, his comments to the 
defendant about his lawyer's handling of the case pale, but the disciplinary body and 
the reviewing court did mention that they, too, were improper. Id. Now, guess what 
type of discipline the prosecutor received for all of this? Initially, he received a 
reprimand; on appeal, he received sixty days of suspension. Id. at 17. 
119. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 9 530.11(2), (6) (McKinney 1995 & Supp. 2000). 
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time, who never speak to their clients, who never investigate a crime 
scene or look for witnesses or verify an alibi or work up a creative 
alternative sentence-would relieve Mr. Defender and appoint new 
counsel, whether at our request or Mr. Cliente's. I could hear the 
judge laughing now and saying, "Let me get this straight-you got an 
airtight, dead-on, all-bases-loaded confession, IN the presence of 
counsel, and now you're complaining?" 
Moreover, putting Mr. Defender on the defensive about his having 
allowed Mr. Cliente to spill his guts to us could jeopardize our ability 
to use the incriminating statement if we did have to try the case. 
Hearing the judge's laughter, Mr. Defender might "forget" what his 
client had said and might find a way to induce Mr. Cliente to "forget" 
it also. Then, if the case went fonvard to trial and we needed to use it, 
it would turn into a swearing match. Not that I thought that two 
student assistant district attorneys and one law professor wouldn't 
look pretty credible, but in this business, you learn to take nothing for 
granted. There was no denying that strategically, we would be in a 
better position if the sleeping dog remained undisturbed. As far as we 
could tell, as long as no one suggested that Mr. Defender shouldn't 
have allowed Mr. Cliente to talk, it seemed a reasonable bet that 
neither the lawyer nor the defendant would try to deny that the 
statement had been made. 
111. THE DECISION: ARE WE ETHICALLY REQUIRED 
TO SPIT INTO THE WIND? 
By now, you have probably gathered that the decision we reached 
was not to intervene, not to report, and not to advise Mr. Cliente 
about his lawyer's deficits. It is still not easy to explain why. It was 
the product of an accumulation of many intangible factors. 
First, the legalistic analysis seemed to indicate: (1) that our duty to 
"do justice" gives rise to a discretionary, rather than mandatory, duty 
to intervene, because Mr. Defender's bizarre behavior did not quite 
achieve the brain-dead level that defines a Shth Amendment 
violation under the current case law; and (2) that we did have a much 
stronger and clearer obligation, pursuant to N.Y. Code DR 1-103(A), 
to report him to the disciplinary authorities-but not necessarily 
immediately, right in the thick of sorting out our more fundamental 
task of doing justice: determining the disposition and sentence to seek 
in the case against Mr. Cliente.lZ0 
120. Cf: Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawvyers. Q 5 cmt. i (1998) (stating 
that common interpretation is that lawyer involved in litigation or negotiation is not 
required to report wrong-doing of another lawyer involved in that matter until its 
conclusion); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof1 Responsibility. Formal Op. 94-383 
(1994) (implying lawyer may delay reporting if in interest of client); Ass'n of the B. of 
the City of N.Y., Comm. Prof I. and Jud. Ethics, Informal Op. 81-100 (1952) (stating 
that lawyer should delay reporting pursuant to DR 7-102(B). if it would be 
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An additional complication was the fact that we are not individual 
lawyers solely responsible for our ethical decisions. As members of a 
quite hierarchical office with a high public profile, we clearly could do 
nothing out of the ordinary routine without first consulting our 
superiors and taking it through channels. We could anticipate 
consuming many hours, not only of our time but of the officials who 
would have to be consulted, in discussion of the ramifications of any 
action, not just for this case but as a precedent within the District 
Attorney's office. The Pace Prosecution Clinic is a guest of the 
Manhattan D.A.'s office; like any guest, we do not want to abuse our 
welcome, or become more trouble than we are worth. Did we really 
want to bother Mr. Morgenthau with this tawdry tale of an encounter 
in a hallway in Criminal Court? Did we want to raise this issue, in the 
face of the observations by other assistants about this lawyer that 
seemingly had gone unreported? Would our taking action trigger a 
retaliatory "ethics war" in which defense lawyers would be looking to 
pounce on, for example, a hapless assistant handling a huge calendar 
of cases, who misread an instruction note from another ADA, and 
falsely announced that the People were ready to proceed when in fact 
that wasn't true? 
Then, too, what would the disciplinary authorities do with a report 
if we made one? I knew, from personal experience as a pro bono trial 
counsel to the Disciplinary Committee of the Appellate Division, First 
Department, as well as from some study of the subject, that it could 
take years to resolve even a straightforward complaint about stealing 
funds. And would a disciplinary authority-could it?-impose a 
higher standard of performance on Mr. Defender than the 
exceedingly low threshold of ineffective assistance? Yes, courts did 
insist, in theory, that there was no necessary congruence between a 
reversal for ineffective assistance and the competence requirements of 
Canon 6 and Model Rule 1.1.121 But surely all Mr. Defender would 
have to do is assert his right to be wrong, to make mistakes, to try 
"risky and unorthodox" defense ~trategies , '~~ and that would be the 
advantageous to client); Ass'n of the B. of the City of N.Y., Comm. on ProPl Ethics. 
Formal Op. 1990-3 (1990) (finding some delay in reporting pursuant to DR 1-103(A) 
may be warranted to protect a client's interest). But see Conn. B. Ass'n Comm. on 
Prof'l Ethics, Op. 97-33 (1997) (obliging lawyer to report misconduct promptly and 
without waiting for outcome of pending lawsuit). 
121. See supra note 98. 
122. One reason courts profess to be so wary of meaningful enforcement of the 
right to competent counsel in the Sixth Amendment context is a concern that they 
might stifle risky and innovative lawyering strategies. See Tippins v. Walker, 77 F.3d 
682, 686 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that "in case after case," following Strickland, courts 
decline to deem counsel ineffective despite tactics that seem "risky, unorthodox or 
downright ill-advised"). Courts and the American Bar Association are also vigilant 
not to conflate "ordinary negligence" or errors of judgment or malpractice with the 
"neglect" that could sustain a disciplinary sanction. See Wolfram, supra note 17, at 
188-89. 
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end of the inquiry. Unwise, even foolish judgments by a lawyer are 
not the basis for ethical discipline. 
In light of that, it might have made more sense (albeit not 
technically complied with the CodeIRules) to report our concerns to 
Mr. Defender's supervisors or those to whom Mr. Defender was 
a~countab1e.l~~ Otherwise, they were unlikely to learn of our 
allegations; the 18-B Panel administrator, for example, has no way of 
knowing whether attorneys on the Panel have been disciplined by the 
Disciplinary Committee, unless an attorney seeking recertification to 
the Panel volunteers that information. Supervisors or administrators, 
unlike us, would be in a position to discuss what had occurred with 
Mr. Defender and probe to see if indeed there was some "expose the 
jugular" negotiating ~trategy,'~%oowever misguided, in his mind. 
There was no way, however, to recreate the surreal ambience of 
that encounter, and Mr. Defender would undoubtedly recast, if not 
outright deny, at least some of what had occurred. Our accusations 
would precipitate much Sturm und Drang in the small, intimate world 
of New York City's Criminal Court. Word would spread quickly, 
there would be charges and counter-charges, revival of the accusations 
that our student assistant district attorneys were too assiduous in their 
prosecution of minor cases, defense lawyers ostentatiously refusing to 
speak with us off the record, disapproving judges who would say that 
Mr. Defender was a fine, sensible, cooperative lawyer-hassle and 
bad feelings-maybe an article in the New York Law Journal before 
all was done. And, in the end, what would there be to show for it? In 
Criminal Court, people were used to snarling at one another, blaming 
one another, and exculpating themselves for its nonstop lunacies and 
tragedies. There is no ethos, in this setting, of taking responsibility for 
your actions, being grateful for trenchant criticism, or striving for ever 
better performance. There would be no constructive dialogue with 
anyone about what to do about Mr. Defender. Weary, overburdened, 
and cynical administrators at every level would end up muttering, 
"What's the difference? There's plenty more where he came from," 
and wishing that they didn't have to deal with these naive kids from 
law school and their ivory-tower professor, who just don't know the 
score. Mr. Defender would be back in no time-might even continue 
to represent Mr. Cliente. But we would have bought trouble for our 
case, and exacerbated the risk to Josetta" safety, which would 
disappear from center stage while the drama of the Bad Lawyer 
123. In my deliberately obscure scenario, that might have been (1) a Legal Aid 
Society borough chief of the Criminal Defense Division, if Mr. Defender worked for 
Legal Aid; (2) the Indigent Defense Oversight Committee, if he worked for one of 
the contract defenders; or (3) the 18-B Panel Administrator. if he were a member of 
the rotating panel kom the private bar assigned on a m e - b y a e  basis. 
124. Harry T. Edwards & James J. White. The Lawyer as a Negotiator 118 (1977) 
(describing negotiation technique of "throwing oneself on the mercy of the opponcnt" 
by displaying the negotiator's weakness and reliance on the ethics of the opponent). 
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played itself out over a series of adjournments, motions and counter- 
motions, briefing schedules, and hearings in various venues. Our 
energies, supposed to be concentrated on the complexities of domestic 
violence prosecution and already stretched to the max as we tried to 
help as many complainants as we could, would instead be diverted to 
all of this activity. We might lose track of Josetta in the process-or 
his threats and wheedling, and the arduousness of her life without his 
economic and social support might wear her down-and what Mr. 
Defender had asserted might indeed come true, as it did in so many, 
many cases: our complainant would no longer be willing to testify or 
participate in the prosecution. Then things would really get ugly. 
In the end, it did come down to the raw confrontation between our 
desire to help and protect an innocent victim-and you'll just have to 
trust me, Josetta was-and the 99.9%-likely-to-be-futile effort to get 
the guilty Mr. Cliente a better lawyer. In the end, it wasn't even close. 
IV. AN EXAMPLE OF CASUISTRY? CONTEXTUAL ETHICAL 
DECISION-MAKING INFORMED, BUT NOT CONTROLLED, 
BY THE RULES 
So, I must live with an outcome that I cannot explain as following a 
rule that I would universalize. Nor can I describe it as a justifiable 
departure from the rule that I would choose to universalize: i.e., that 
prosecutors ought to report unacceptably poor representation by 
defense counsel to those administrative personnel who potentially 
could act on the information to protect defendants from involuntary 
assignment of such lawyers, as well as doing whatever else prosecutors 
can to enhance the quality of that representation, including aggressive 
advocacy for adequate compensation and resources for the defense 
bar. Intellectually, this seems to me the right mandate. But, it's not 
what we did in this case. 
It is hard not to see our decision as unprincipled expediency of the 
worst sort. The rules of ethics are there to direct our decision-making 
not when the choices are easy or clear, but when they are obscure and 
difficult. Even assuming I were a pure consequentialist, there is 
always the possibility that had I intervened to help Mr. Cliente get a 
new and better lawyer, he still would have been convicted and Josetta 
would have been protected. It's possible that Mr. Defender's next 
client will be another victim of family violence, a child or a woman 
who fought back against abuse and needs a skilled and diligent 
attorney, and because of my decision not to jeopardize, even slightly, 
Josetta (or do I mean to say, our case against Mr. Cliente?), Mr. 
Defender will replicate his parody of criminal defense at her expense. 
Will I have achieved real justice, then? 
This Symposium, of course, reminds us that there is another theory 
of ethical decision-making, one that promises to absolve me of both 
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my deontological sin and my consequentialist failure. I don't think I 
can improve on the description of the merits of this approach found in 
Professor Paul R. Tremblay's essays, The New Casr i i~try '~  and the 
earlier The Role of Casuistry in Legal Ethics: A Tentative Inquiry.lZ6 If 
I have grasped it right, casuistry would allow me to couple my 
"answer" in this case with the assertion that in another case, with 
another complainant, perhaps one with more social support, 
emotional resources, and safety options than Josetta, I might make a 
different decision-and that both decisions, in a real sense, could be 
deemed "right." 
Going all the way back to Professor Monroe Freedman's path- 
breaking article on prosecutorial ethics,ln he was perhaps the first to 
argue, at least in regard to the practice of law, for a "system of 
professional responsibility" that "attempts to deal with ethical 
problems in context, giving full consideration both to motive and 
consequences" rather than one that "rests upon rigidly legalistic 
adherence to norms, regardless of the contex?."lB The last line of that 
article summarizes the starting point of the casuistrist: 
m e  should no longer delude ourselves that the complexities of 
what constitutes responsible professional conduct in the context of 
an adversary system can be resolved by syllogistic deductions from 
vague canons or dogmatic pre~cripts.'~~ 
It is, indeed, altogether comforting to think that the decision to 
privilege Josetta's safety over our role-prescribed duty to intervene 
with or report Mr. Defender reflects the kind of "ethical inquiry" 
lauded by Professor Phyllis Goldfarb in A Theory-Practice Spiral: The 
Ethics of Feminism and Clinical Edu~a t ion . '~  Professor Goldfarb 
writes: 
From feminists' and clinicians' relentless demand for elaborate 
concrete detail and for special attention to the data provided by 
those whom society frequently disempowers comes a reconceived 
notion of what qualifies as ethical inquiry. . . . The focus of ethical 
theory is no longer the justification of actions affecting the 
"generalized others" of traditional philosophy, but the justification 
of actions affecting the "concrete others" with whom we are 
enmeshed.. . . In the hands of feminists and clinicians, ethics 
becomes a sustained practice of empirical attention and reflection 
on the actions of people in actual situations."' 
125. Supra note 19. 
126. 1 Clinical L. Rev. 493 (1994). 
127. Freedman, The Professional Responsibility of rile Proseairing Afrorney, nipra 
note 43. 
128. Id at 1046-47. 
129. Id at 1047. 
130. 75 Minn. L. Rev. 1599 (1991). 
131. Id at 1697-98 (internal citations omitted). 
Heinonline - -  69 Fordham L. Rev. 1 0 4 5  2 0 0 0 - 2 0 0 1  
1046 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69 
Yet, I confess to lingering doubt that "attention and reflection," 
however sustained, is necessarily always a satisfactory substitute for 
the categorical imperatives of code-like rules. The limitations of the 
case-based model of ethical decision-making are thrown into higher 
relief for me by my experience as a teacher. Too often my students 
seem too eager to "trust their instincts" and "feel" their way toward a 
solution to their dilemmas. They will happily engage in a "sustained" 
conversation about the issue, but are less willing to go to the library 
and research the thinking of other lawyers embodied in rules, ethics 
committee opinions, and judicial decisions. 
Different approaches to ethical decision-making may be 
appropriate for the more and the less experienced. Maybe it takes 
years of assiduous compliance (or at least attempts to comply) with 
the absolute Kantian imperatives of the letter of the law, or more 
years of utilitarian calculus, to develop the capacity to see the 
contextual details that enable us to use casuistry instead. Paul 
Tremblay himself suggests as much: 
Casuistry not only demands context, but it also insists upon a form 
of expertise. All practitioners are not equally "wise." Those who are 
better at casuistry, and therefore at moral reasoning itself, are those 
who have developed the wisdom.. . necessary todevelop 
considered moral judgments.'" 
How, though, do we know that we have arrived at this point-that 
we have acquired this "wisdomn-if not by comparing our outcomes, 
not just our process, with something external to and independent of 
our own judgments? If not rules and principles, then what? The 
"paradigm cases?" Can those be not cases that you've read about, but 
cases that you've lived? 
On reflection, I suspect that my decision about Mr. Defender was 
grounded in far deeper knowledge and experience than my students 
could muster-a kind of "been there, tried that" experiential 
erudition that enabled me to predict, for example, that had I reported 
Mr. Defender, most likely he would not have lost his jobIl8-B Panel 
certification; that he would have continued representing other 
defendants and even, quite possibly, continued representing Mr. 
Cliente; that, had any kind of authoritative inquiry133 alerted him to 
the notion that the quality of his defense was being examined, and 
132. Tremblay, The New Casuistry, supra note 19, at 522. 
133. The typical practice of the First Department Disciplinary Committee, for 
example, had that been my chosen route, would have required me to file a short 
written complaint, which would have been sent to its subject, the "respondent," for an 
answer. The complaint is not anonymous; in most cases, as in this one, the identity of 
the grievant would be instantaneously identifiable. 
Had I instead filed a complaint with the Legal Aid Society or with the 18-B Panel 
or with the Indigent Defense Organization Oversight Committee (responsible for 
assessment of all the contract providers in the First Department), a slightly less formal 
process would have amounted to the same basic procedure. 
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that I was the instigator of the inquiry, he would have waxed far more 
zealous and vigilant on behalf of Mr. Cliente, with deleterious results 
for the innocent victim. Perhaps on balance, "all things considered," 
we did, after all, do something like the right thing. Of course, the 
response-if any-to this article may change my mind about some of 
these underlying assumptions. Or, possibly, its writing and 
publication \Trill prompt some discussion and reflection within the 
offices of district attorneys about the need to develop clear rules, or at 
least articulated policies, that isill not leave individual assistants trying 
to chart a casuistric course by the hazy stars of DR 6-101 and DR 1- 
103(A), and "the duty to do justi~e." '~ 
CONCLUSION: DOES CASUISTRY BELONG M 
THE REPERTOIRE OF THE PROSECUTOR? 
As may be obvious, I have hardly reached a state of clarity or 
equilibrium about either what I did in the case of Mr. Cliente and Mr. 
Defender, or what I would do in the next such case. It is worrisome 
and unsettling, this sense of bridled, but essentially self-directed, 
discretion. I suppose it is part of my ongoing initiation into the moral 
complexity of the prosecutorial role, a complexity that continues to 
startle my Inner Defender, who keeps wanting to say that while I love 
the righteous feeling of being licensed to do justice-and cherish it as 
the unique privilege that, for lawyers, it is-still, the prosecutorial role 
lacks the tragic grandeur, and its ethical challenges the graviras, of 
those of the criminal defense lawyer. Right??? 
As a defense lawyer, what I felt was not merely ambivalence about 
my work; it was far more multi-layered than that. My every reaction 
provoked not just an equal and opposite reaction, but a cascade of 
multiple chain reactions in all directions. Delight mingled with disgust 
when I bamboozled an ignorant judge or charmed a sexist one into 
letting out of jail a client who was undoubtedly guilty- but who just as 
surely did not belong in jail. Winning an acquittal brought rapture 
and ecstasy, only to be deflated almost immediately by the grim 
prognosis for my client as he emerged from jail after twenty-two 
months without a home, a friend, or a future that could be imagined. 
Near-homicidal fury possessed me when a miserable, lonely, and 
mentally-impaired man or woman accused, and generally guilty, of 
some petty crime was treated with casual, callous, unnecessary cruelty 
by police officers and court officers and corrections officers and 
probation officers and, not infrequently, judges and prosecutors-and 
134. C '  Zacharias, Justice in Plea Bargai~ii~ig, supra note 62, at 1182-89 (stating 
that prosecutors' offices should specify models of plea bargaining and develop 
uniform "ex ante" plea-bargaining policies); see also Roberta K.  Flowers. A Code of 
Their Own- Updating the Ethics Codes to I~tcl~tde rile Non-Adversarial Roles of 
Federal Prosecutors, 37 B.C. L. Rev. 923,963-64 (1996) (stating that prosecutors need 
more specific direction from ethical codes). 
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other defenders. I learned that legally, there was really nothing I 
could do to stop the abuse, nor to puncture the lazy, uncaring, 
unprofessional, shallow, and benighted attitudes that fostered it. That 
fury would quickly reverse field into a less intense but still debilitating 
anger when clients "got themselves" re-arrested after I had knocked 
myself out getting them released, or when they wanted to plead guilty 
but balked at accepting a short jail sentence because a diabolically 
clever judge was dangling five years of probation in front of them,135 
or when they did any of a number of other self-destructive things. I 
had no idea that prosecutors ever suffered torments remotely parallel 
to these. 
In time, my neophyte panic as a "baby defender"136 that I didn't 
know how to do anything, and then that I couldn't do everything I had 
to do, was superseded by episodic, but recurrent, moments of pride 
and wonderment that I was managing to function and even derive 
considerable satisfaction from the devotion of every molecule of my 
being to this enterprise. Those moments, though, were interspersed 
with more and more puzzlement about the meaning and impact of the 
work.13' Pace my dear and much-admired colleague Professor Abbe 
Smith, comparisons to Atticus Finch in To Kill a Mockingbird did not, 
for me, ring true.13* It was about this point that I encountered the 
then-burgeoning field of bioethics, and found in the messy multi- 
party, multi-polar constellations of medical decision-making about 
135. For some of my clients, it was statistically more likely that they would win the 
Nobel Peace Prize than complete probation in the next five years without violating its 
terms and subjecting themselves to a far stiffer sentence of incarceration than the one 
offered at the time of the plea. For those who could take care of themselves 
reasonably well in jail-a category one learned to identify as a defense lawyer-six 
months on the Rock (Riker's Island, in the East River, location of the New York City 
Correctional Institute for Men, where sentenced prisoners doing less than a year were 
housed in conditions that were not intolerable, though extremely unpleasant, and, 
most important, which was not too far from family and friends) would be a much 
better deal than the seven years upstate that the judge would give them with relish, 
when, inevitably, they got drunk, stoned, or arrested while on probation. Judges 
knew this as well as I did, and would play on the defendant's desperate hope that 
somehow, this time, he would manage to pull off the five years on probation. 
136. For some reason, first-year lawyers on both sides of the aisle at 100 Centre 
Street are tagged as "baby defenders" or "baby prosecutors" or "rookies." 
137. For a truly eloquent exposition of the "meaning" of defense work by a lawyer 
who suffers a horrendous family loss from a random crime, but whose moral 
commitment to his work is undiminished, see Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond 
Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public Defenders, 106 Ham. L. Rev. 1239 
(1993). 
138. Professor Smith of Georgetown is one of the most prolific and incisive 
scholars to scrutinize and synthesize theories of the criminal defender's professional 
role. I continue to read her work with thrills of recognition because she gets it all so 
right. In more than one of her often partially autobiographical pieces, she alludes to 
the impact of the image of Atticus Finch in Harper Lee's To Kill A Mockingbird 
(1960) on her pride and satisfaction in that role. See Abbe Smith, Rosie O'Neill Goes 
to Law School: The Clinical Education of the Sensitive New Age Public Defender, 28 
Ham. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1,51-52 (1993). 
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scarce resources, personal responsibility, autonomy versus 
paternalism, and the like, problems and issues that were reminiscent 
of my own questions and worries, and that wooed me away from the 
starkly bipolar world of criminal defense. At that time, in the early 
1970s, there was precious little in the legal ethics literature that 
resonated with the volatile mixture of bliss and agony that seemed to 
be my lot at 100 Centre Street.139 
I ended up spending many years immersed in the field of bioethics, 
gradually expanding into other fields of professional ethics, eventually 
139. It is remarkable, in retrospect, to realize how few of the works that now serve 
me as compasses, if not maps, in times of professional confusion were extant at that 
time. Before the Model Code was promulgated in 1969. there was no real set of 
enforceable, prescriptive rules for the legal profession; its predecessor, the American 
Bar Association Canons of Ethics of 1908 amounted to more of a "creed" than a 
"code." James E. Molitemo, Lawyer Creeds and Moral Seismograplny, 32 Wake 
Forest L. Rev. 781,794 (1997). Legal ethics, of course. was not a required course in 
American law schools; there was no Multistate Professional Responsibility 
Examination. Monroe Freedman's Lairyen' Erhicr in An Adversaty Sysrem, supra 
note 43, did not come out until 1975, the same year as Richard Wasserstrom's 
Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues. 5 Hum. Rts. 1 (1975) (although what 
would become key chapters in Freedman's book, The Professional Responsibility of 
the Prosecuting Attorney, 55 Geo. LJ. 1030 (1967) and Professiornal Responsibility of 
the Criminal Defense Lawyer The Three Hardesr Questions, 64 Mich. L Rev. 1469 
(1966), had appeared almost a decade earlier). The first "mebook" for clinical 
courses, Gary Bellow's and Bea Moulton's The Lalvyering Procerc Materials for 
Clinical Instruction in Advocacy, published in 1978, was permeated with ethical 
decision-making of depth and sophistication; there shortly followed the inimitable 
Becoming A Lawyec A Humanistic Perspective on Legal Ed~rcation and 
Professionalism (Elizabeth Dvorkin, Jack Himmelstein and Howard Lcsnick eds.), 
published in 1981 although first issued in a monograph in 1980. The Politics of Law 
A Progressive Critique, David Kairys' superb collection of critical essays on the 
functions of law and lawyers, was published in 1982. Charles Wolfnm's Modem 
Legal Ethics, supra note 17, came out in 1986 to replace Henry Drinker's long- 
outdated Legal Ethics (1953). 
It is no surprise, then, that in the early and mid-1970s, the concepts and vocabulary 
for going beyond a superficial analysis of the why's and wherefore's of lawyering were 
not readily available. The only text I can recall at that time that really addressed the 
angst of the criminal defense lawyer was David Mellinkoffs Tile Consciernce of A 
Lawyer (1973), a wonderful exposition of nineteenth-century British murder cases, 
with examples of the opprobrium heaped on the lawyers who defended the accused 
and their spirited responses. Mellinkoff raised powerful arguments for the overriding 
values of loyalty to clients and confidentiality of client communications. and 
addressed the pressures defense lawyers endure from a hostile citizenry, but did not 
really describe or deal with any internal conflict or self-doubt on the part of these 
lawyers. 
In 1969, the newly-minted American Bar Association Code of Professional 
Responsibility supplanted and certainly improved upon the 19B Canons. But as a 
response to the pervasive dismay, malaise, and anxiety that characterized my defense 
lawyer persona, the new Code's rules and even its Ethical Considerations seemed 
very limited. They were still too much the "vaporous platitudes.. . which have 
somewhat less usefulness as guides to lawyers in the predicaments of the real world 
than do valentine cards as guides to heart surgeons in the operating roomn in the 
classic phrase of Anthony Amsterdam. one of the most renowned criminal defense 
lawyers and teachers of lawyering ever. Wolfram. Modem Legal Ethics, supra note 
17, at 55 11.29 (quoting T i e ,  May 13,1966, at 81). 
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refocusing primarily on legal ethics, precisely because of the relentless 
need I had experienced as a criminal defense lawyer to better 
understand the moral implications of what I was doing. Despite the 
exalted place of certain principles in much bioethical analysis,140 
bioethics is also the locus of a prolonged rehabilitation of the 
casuistric method.141 So the concept is hardly foreign to me, although 
I have to admit, until the invitation to participate in this Symposium, it 
had been a very long time since I had given it much thought. 
When this summer I found myself returning again and again in my 
thoughts and ultimately on my computer to the story of Mr. Defender 
and Ivlr. Cliente, with a continuing sense of mingled shame and 
contrition over how it was handled, I was happy to renew my 
acquaintance with the principle of casuistry (if that isn't too much of a 
contradiction in terms). In fact I quite seized upon the idea that my 
inaction in this case was not merely lawless, self-indulgent, or self- 
protective, but rather the product of a complex and inarticulable 
process of "deliberative judgment," to borrow one revered scholar's 
term,142 or of a "case-based, particularized, context-driven method of 
normative decision-making."'43 I would like to think, of course, that 
perhaps we did arrive at "the best solution, all things considered."14 
The notion that hard decisions can legitimately be grounded in 
"practical ethics" or "prudence" is naturally attractive to a clinician 
who has taught and studied and practiced and reflected on clinical 
decision-making, decision-making under conditions of uncertainty, 
and the exercise of clinical judgment in medicine, in law, and in other 
professions for nearly twenty years. 
And yet . . . 
I am not wholly convinced. In the same Symposium issue in which 
Paul Tremblay does such an excellent job of presenting the virtues of 
casuistry as a mode of ethical problem-solving, the author of the 
140. See, e.g., Tom L. Beauchamp & James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical 
Ethics (4th ed. 1994). 
141. See, e.g., Symposium, Emerging Paradigms in Bioethics, 69 Ind. L.J. 945 
(1994); John D. Arras, Principles and Particularity: The Role of Cases in Bioethics, 69 
Ind. L.J. 983 (1994); Franklin G. Miller et al., Clinical Pragmatism: John Dewey nnd 
Clinical Ethics, 13 J .  Contemp. Health L. & Pol'y 27 (1996); Susan M. Wolf, Shifting 
Paradigms in Bioethics and Health Law: The Rise of a New Pragmatism, 20 Am. J.L. 
& Med. 395 (1994); see also Judith C. Ahronheim, et al., Ethics in Clinical Practice 
(1994); A.R. Jonsen et al., Clinical Ethics (3d ed. 1992); Terry M. Perlin, Clinical 
Medical Ethics: Cases in Practice (1992); Robert M. Veatch, Case Studies in Medical 
Ethics (1977). 
142. See Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal 
Profession 40-44, 264-70; 326-27, 362, 375-76 (1993) (arguing that lawyers should be 
trained in law school to exercise "practical wisdomw-more an attribute of character 
than a skill-and lawyers' distinctive expertise: the craft of handling particular cases 
while recognizing their peculiarities, idiosyncrasies, and moral complexities). 
143. Tremblay, The New Casuistry, supra note 19, at 492. 
144. Id. at 520. 
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Foreword, Heidi Li Feldman, points out some of the ri~ks.~'"ivid, 
concrete examples of moral dilemmas that allow the reader or hearer 
to "vicariously inhabit" the ethical world-view of others surely can be 
instructive occasions for thinking about professional ethics, but they 
should not be too readily reduced to "sloppy conclusions" in an 
attempt to "immediately deriv[e] principles or judgments."'~ Can I 
really be confident that the next time I confront an abysmally bad 
defense lawyer (and there will be a next time-probably within the 
next few months), I will make the "best" decision, "all things 
~onsidered"?'~~ If I have no moral compass in the form of at least a 
presumptive rule (e.g., "unless there's a really good reason not to, I 
will report that lawyer"), but instead have to make my way via "moral 
triang~lation,"~~~ will I generate the moral momentum' to overcome 
the hard-to-explain but powerful internal resistance to doing 
something about that lawyer that I now know I will feel? 
Especially in the prosecutorial context, the very epicenter of 
untrammeled lawyering discretion, a place where norms of fairness 
and consistency must be so scrupulously observed, casuistry may not 
work. Most lawyers do not have as strong a role-obligation to make 
sure that each client or each case is treated exactly the same way. For 
prosecutors, treating categorically similar cases differently-even 
when an adequately "thick description" of the caseslJ9 might highlight 
valid distinctions among them-is pr0b1ernatic.l~ We do not have the 
luxury of devoting as many hours as it has taken to wvrite this article to 
explaining the nuances of each case to a community often already 
suspicious of our bonafides. A compelling example of the potential of 
such an approach to make mischief is found in Angela J. Davis' 
Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of D i s c r e t i ~ n . ~ ~ ~  
Professor Davis begins her essay by describing a case she 
encountered in 1987, during her years of practice wvith the Public 
Defenders Service for the District of Columbia ("PDS").ls It was a 
case in which a prosecutor utilized his discretion to do what many in 
the criminal defense community would like to see more often: to 
- - 
145. Heidi Li Feldman, Fore~vord, Beyond tlte Model Rules Tlte Place of fiamples 
in Legal Ethics, 12 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 409,431-32 (1999). 
146. Id  at 430-31 
147. Tremblay, The New Casuistry, stcpra note 19. at 520. 
148. Id  at 518,534. 
149. See i d  at 521; Paul R. Tremblay, Coherence and Incolterence in Val~res-Talk, 5 
Clinical L. Rev. 325,328 n.2 (1998). 
150. See James Vorenburg, Decent Restrai~tr of Prosectitorial Power. 94 Harv. L 
Rev. 1521,1554-57 (1981) (calling for a vast reduction in prosecutorial discretion, in 
part because "prosecutors can and do accord different treatment.. . on grounds that 
are not written down anywhere and may not have been either rational, consistent, or 
discoverable in advance;" "a discretionary system.. . altcays carries the potential for 
invidious discrimination . . . ." (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted)). 
151. 67 Fordham L. Rev. 13 (1998). 
152 Id  at 13-17. 
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affirmatively seek out exculpatory evidence, present it to a grand jury, 
and allow the grand jury to return no bill-something that had never 
happened in a homicide case before in Professor Davis' experience 
and that of her PDS colleagues. But they did not celebrate this as a 
breakthrough. Why? Because the defendant was a young white 
college student who had hacked to death with a machete his 
roommate, a middle-aged Vietnamese restaurant worker. The race, 
class and other statuses of the defendant and the victim were the only 
factors that seemed to explain the prosecutor's unprecedented 
exercise of discretion. Whatever the "practical wisdom" of that 
prosecutor, it was a poor choice to make this case the occasion to 
depart from the routine treatment of murder. So here, perhaps, is yet 
another way i i  which prosecutors are different. Among all the varied 
types of lawyers for whom it might be advisable and advantageous to 
embrace casuistry, not only for them and their clients but for the 
larger community as well, perhaps the one role that does not and 
should not lend itself to an even more amorphous definition of ethical 
responsibilities is the prosecutorial. Just as with the traditional codes' 
familiar admonition that the "public prosecutor cannot take as a guide 
for the conduct of his office the standards of an attorney appearing on 
behalf of an individual client," in this post-modem age of redefined 
professional ethics,153 prosecutors may be confined to a more 
circumscribed repertoire of ethical decision-making than our private- 
sector counterparts. That is, ironically, because prosecutors enjoy 
such broad discretion as "the most powerful lawyers,"lS4 it is all the 
more crucial that we appear to be, and are, reined in by scrupulous 
adherence to principles and rules - even the peculiar challenge posed 
by rules like DR 1-103(A) and Model Rule 8.3. 
As Professor Davis wrote: 
Prosecutors have been given more power and discretion than any 
other criminal justice official, so they have a greater ability to effect 
change where it is needed.. . .They can, and should, set a higher 
standard of performance for themselves than the requirements set 
by the Supreme Court.lS5 
When it comes to our duty vis-a-vis an incompetent defender, 
Professor Davis would surely agree that prosecutors ought to meet a 
higher standard than that set by the Strickland Court.156 
Considerations that could be deemed "contextual"-the degree of 
153. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble With the Adversary System in a 
Postmodern, Multicultural World, 38 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 5,37-44 (1996); Monroe H. 
Freedman, The Trouble With Postmodern Zeal, 38 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 63 (1996); see 
ako Drucilla Cornell, Toward A Modem/Postmodern Reconstntction of Ethics, 133 U .  
Pa. L. Rev. 291 (1985). 
154. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, supra note 8, at 625-30. 
155. Davis, supra note 151, at 67. 
156. See supra note 69. 
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certitude about a particular defendant's guilt, the perceived need to 
protect a particular civilian victim with limited resources, a conviction 
that it would be futile to complain to a particular presiding judge or to 
the disciplinary authorities in that jurisdiction-may, in fact, have no 
legitimate place in the prosecutor's ethical analysis. 
I know that I concur with those who would reverse the current 
thrust of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence: that each inquiry is fact- 
specific, that there is and can be no "checklist" of appropriate defense 
actions that, when neglected wholesale, establishes a prima facie case 
of ineffective assistance, etc.'" The quality of a defendant" counsel 
should not be determined as normlessly as it is now.'5s It may well be 
that casuistry, a decision-making technique that lets prosecutors 
exercise their enormous discretion with even greater "case-by-case" 
latitude, is a tool that too easily can serve the powerful.lb9 It is the less 
powerful lawyers-those who represent the poor and disadvantaged- 
who need and should have the right, when making decisions about 
professional role and responsibilities, to take into account the 
concrete realities of their particular clients' lives in the actual context 
of those lives. Judges and prosecutors-those in the legal system who 
are privileged with power-need more structured and ex-traneous 
constraints. 
CODA 
Just before sending this article off to Fordham Law Review, I 
received a draft manuscript from Abbe Smith, the quintessential 
defense lawyer, with the engaging title, "Can You Be a Good Person 
157. See Calhoun, supra note 69; Klein, Tire Relariorlslrip of rite Colrrt and Defense 
Counsel, supra note 11, at 578-84 (arguing that courts should conduct pretrial 
conferences and require pretrial checklists in criminal cases, to ensure adequate 
preparation, which can be "objectively assessed"); see also William W .  Sch\vaner, 
Dealing With Incompetent Counsel-The Trial Judge's Role, 93 Ham. L. Rev. 633, 
649-665 (1980) (outlining "guidelines for intervention and assessment of attorney 
performance" at every phase of the criminal pretrial and trial process). Reading the 
case law on ineffective assistance, with all its talk about the "judgment" that is 
presumed to have been exercised by the defense lawyer, is all too reminiscent of the 
"new casuistry." 
158. See, cg., People v. Ellis, 81 N.Y.2d 854,856 (N.Y. 1993) (finding there can be 
no "litmus test" for ineffective assistance); People v. Garcia. 75 N.Y.2d 973,974 (N.Y. 
1990) (holding that to establish ineffective assistance, defendant must show that 
counsel could have had no conceivable strategic or legitimate purpose). 
159. I am reminded here of the policy disagreements about another decision- 
making tool praised for its freedom from inflexible norms, but suspect when used in 
the context of an imbalance of power: mediation in domestic violence cases. See Linda 
K.  Girdner, Mediation, in ABA Comm'n on Domestic Violence, The Impact of 
Domestic Violence On Your Legal Practice, A Lawyer's Handbook. 4-17 to 4-20 
(Deborah M. Goelman et al. eds. 1996); Lisa G. Lerman. Mediarion of Wife Abuse 
Cases: The Adverse Impact of Inforntal Dispure Resohrriort on Women. 7 Ham. 
Women's LJ. 57 (1984). 
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and a Good P r o s e c ~ t o r ? " ~ ~ ~  A typically wise, wonderful, and wicked 
product of Professor Smith, it capsulizes all that I have written above 
into a few sentences: 
[Wlhy have I never encountered-or even heard of a single 
prosecutor who has come forward to halt a trial in the face of plainly 
incompetent defense counsel? The right to competent counsel is 
central to every other right of the criminally accused, and the denial 
of that right threatens the foundation of adversarial justice. Surely, 
prosecutors have an ethical obligation to do something-and not just 
take advantage-when they encounter a plainly ineffective defense 
lawyer. 
There are instances of incompetent, drunk, hung-over, and sleeping 
lawyers representing the indigent accused in every courthouse in the 
country, but there is never any mention of the other institutional 
actors who are present doing anything about it. The prosecutor[s] 
clearly know [I what is going on.  . . why don't they at least approach 
the bench and make a record of the incompetence they observe?16' 
Next time, Abbe, I hope to do better.162 
160. Manuscript on file with the author. 
161. Id. at 71-73 (footnote omitted). 
162. The somewhat disapproving tone of comments received on earlier drafts of 
this piece has chastened me into doing what originally I had deliberately chosen not 
to do: tell the ending of Mr. Cliente's story. After all this fulmination, as so often 
happens in Criminal Court, fate intervened. Mr. Cliente continued to violate the 
temporary Order of Protection, eventually resorting to more violence against Josetta; 
he was indicted for felonious Criminal Contempt, at which point it was discovered 
that Mr. Defender was not certified to represent defendants on felonies. The new 
attorney on the felony matter was directed to undertake Mr. Cliente's representation 
on our pending misdemeanors, and ultimately they were subsumed into the 
disposition on the felony. All of this, most likely, would have occurred long before 
the resolution of a complaint about Mr. Defender or the appointment of new counsel 
for Mr. Cliente. 
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